论采购联盟集体谈判力的价格、销量与福利效应
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财经研究 2009 年 第 35 卷第 03 期, 页码：58 - 68
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章以中国的制造业外包服务,即出口加工贸易活动为基础,发展了一个有关本国企业的中间品策略性采购联盟与外国垄断性供给者进行集体谈判的非合作性广义Cournot-Nash谈判模型,探讨是否应该建立中间品策略性采购联盟,以及如何运用其集体谈判力实现行业降低成本、保障供给等问题。文章证明本国与外国之间的中间品与最终产品贸易的互补性既增加了建立采购联盟进行集体谈判的迫切性,也复杂化了集体谈判力的价格、销量与福利效应:这些效应既依存于本国策略性采购联盟的偏好这种主观因素,也取决于最终产品需求曲线的弹性与曲率、外国企业的技术以及生产专业化程度等客观因素,其中,采购联盟的偏好因素具有重要的影响。
关键词
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[3]Brecher Richard A,Ngo Van Long.Trade unions in an open economy:Ageneral equi-libriumanalysis[J].Economic Record,1989,65:234-239.
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[6]Ishikawa J,Barbara J Spencer.Rent-shifting export subsidies with an i mported inter-mediate product[J].Journal of International Economics,1999,48:199-232.
[7]Melitz Marc J.The i mpact of trade onintra-industry reallocations and aggregate indus-try productivity[J].Econometrica,2003,71:1695-1725.
[8]Mezzetti C,Elias Dinopoulos.Domestic unionization and i mport competition[J].Jour-nal of International Economics,1991,31:79-100.
[9]Spencer B J,Jones R W.Vertical foreclosure andinternational trade policy[J].Reviewof Economic Studies,1991,58:153-170.
[10]Spencer Barbara J,Larry D Qiu.Keiretsu and relationship-specific invest ments:Barri-er to trade?[J].International Economic Review,2001,42:871-901.
[2]Brander James A,Barbara J Spencer.Unionized oligopoly andinternational trade policy[J].Journal of International Economics,1988,24,217-234.
[3]Brecher Richard A,Ngo Van Long.Trade unions in an open economy:Ageneral equi-libriumanalysis[J].Economic Record,1989,65:234-239.
[4]Grossman Gene M.International competition and the unionized sector[J].CanadianJournal of Economics,1984,17:541-556.
[5]Hall Robert E,David MLilien.Efficient wage bargains under uncertain supply and de-mand[J].American Economic Review,1979,69:868-879.
[6]Ishikawa J,Barbara J Spencer.Rent-shifting export subsidies with an i mported inter-mediate product[J].Journal of International Economics,1999,48:199-232.
[7]Melitz Marc J.The i mpact of trade onintra-industry reallocations and aggregate indus-try productivity[J].Econometrica,2003,71:1695-1725.
[8]Mezzetti C,Elias Dinopoulos.Domestic unionization and i mport competition[J].Jour-nal of International Economics,1991,31:79-100.
[9]Spencer B J,Jones R W.Vertical foreclosure andinternational trade policy[J].Reviewof Economic Studies,1991,58:153-170.
[10]Spencer Barbara J,Larry D Qiu.Keiretsu and relationship-specific invest ments:Barri-er to trade?[J].International Economic Review,2001,42:871-901.
引用本文
王根蓓. 论采购联盟集体谈判力的价格、销量与福利效应[J]. 财经研究, 2009, 35(3): 58–68.
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