张新立, 王青建. A Study on the Optimal Incentive Contract Model for Venture Capitalist——A Game Model under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard[J]. Journal of Finance and Economics, 2006, 32(5): 130–136.
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Journal of Finance and Economics
LiuYuanchun, Editor-in-Chief
ZhengChunrong, Vice Executive Editor-in-Chief
YaoLan BaoXiaohua HuangJun, Vice Editor-in-Chief
A Study on the Optimal Incentive Contract Model for Venture Capitalist——A Game Model under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
Journal of Finance and Economics Vol. 32, Issue 05, pp. 130 - 136 (2006)
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