家族企业管理者角色选择的理论分析——代理理论与管家理论的争论与整合
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外国经济与管理 2008 年 第 30 卷第 04 期, 页码：47 - 51
摘要
参考文献
摘要
管理者是企业的代理人还是管家这是代理理论和管家理论争论的焦点。本文认为,要确定家族企业管理者在家族企业扮演的角色,必须考虑两方面(家族企业的所有者和管理者)的选择倾向,要经过单向选择和双向博弈两个阶段来决定。在家族企业管理者的角色得到确定以后,代理理论和管家理论的应用边界也就会变得明朗。
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[2]Tosi,A L,Brownlee,A L,Silva,P,and Katz,J P.An empirical exploration of decision?Making under agency controls and stew-ardship structure[J].Journal of Management Studies,2003,40:2 053-2 071.
[3]Albanese,R,Dacin,M T,and Harris,I C.Agents as stewards[J].Academy of Management Review,1997,22:609-611.
[4]Donaldson,L,and Davis,J.Boards and company performance:Research challenges the conventional wisdom[J].Corporate Govern-ance International Review,1994,2:151-160.
[5]Corbetta,G,and Salvato,C.Self-serving or self-actualizing?Models of man and agency costs in different types of family firms:Acommentary on“Comparing the agency costs of family and non-family firms:Conceptual issues and exploratory evidence”[J].Entre-preneurship Theory and Practice,2004,28(4):355-362.
[6]Davis,J H,Schoorman,F D,and Donaldson,L.Towards a stewardship theory of management[J].Academy of Management Re-view,1997,22:20-47.
[7]杨林.管家理论与代理理论的比较分析[J].外国经济与管理,2004,26(2):22-27.
[8]苏启林.基于代理理论与管家理论视角的家族企业经理人行为选择[J].外国经济与管理,2007,29(2):51-56.
[9]Hofstede,G,and Bond,M.The Confucius connection:From cultural roots to economic growth[J].Organizational Dynamics,1988,16(4):4-21.
引用本文
陈建林. 家族企业管理者角色选择的理论分析——代理理论与管家理论的争论与整合[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2008, 30(4): 47–51.
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