不完全契约理论与应用研究最新进展
5512 
0
外国经济与管理 2005 年 第 27 卷第 09 期, 页码：16 - 23
摘要
参考文献
摘要
本文在评介和分析不完全契约理论主要观点和缺陷的基础上,比较了不完全契约理论与完全契约理论(委托代理理论)等其他契约理论分支之间的区别与联系,并概括了不完全契约在公司治理机制等三个应用领域研究的新进展。
[1]Williamson,O E.The theory of the firm as governance structure:from choice to contract[J]Journal of Economic Per-spectives,2002,16(3):171-195.
[2]Al-Najjar,N I,Anderlini,L,and Felli,L.Indescribable events[J].Research in Economics,2004,58:3-30.
[3]Tirole,J.Incomplete contracts:where do we stand?[J].Econometrica,1999,67(4):741-781.
[4]Rasmusen,E B.Explaining incomplete contracts as the result of contract-reading costs[J].Advances in Economic Anal-ysis&Policy,2001,1(1):1-32.
[5]Segal,I.Complexity and renegotiation:a foundation for incomplete contract[J].Review of Economic Studies,1999,66:57-82.
[6]Maskin,E,and Tirole,J.Two remarks on the property-rights literature[J].Review of Economic Studies,1999,66:139-149.
[7]Zingales,L.Corporate governance[R].NBER Working Paper No.6309,1997:12-14.
[8]Maskin,E.On indescribable contingencies and incomplete contracts[J].European Economic Review,2002,46(4-5):725-733.
[9]Legros,P et al.Courts,contracts,and interference[J].European Economic Review,2002,46:734-744.
[10]Tirole,J.Corporate governance[J].Hitotsubashi University Econometrica,2001,69:1-35.
[11]Grubb,F.The statutory regulation of colonial servitude:an incomplete-contract approach[J].Explorations in Econom-ic History,2002,37:42-75.
[12]Matimort,D et al.An incomplete contract perspective on public good provision[J].Journal of Economic Surveys,2005,19(2):149-180.
[13]Mastern,S E and Saussier,S.Econometrics of contracts:an assessment of developments in the empirical literature oncontracting[A].In Brousseau,E and Glachant,J M(eds).The economics of contracts:theories and applications[C].Cambridge University Press,2002:273-292.
[14]Sacconi,L.Incomplete contracts and corporate ethics:a game theoretical model under fuzzy information[R].WorkingPapers No.91,Serie Etica,Dirittoed Ecomomica 1,2001:1-3.
[15]Bratton,W W and McCahery,J A.Incomplete contracts theories of the firm and comparative corporate governance[R].Working Papers,Center for Company Law.Tilburg University,2001:1-18.
[16]Bos,D.Privatization and restructuring:an incomplete-contract approach[J].JITE,1999,155:362-383.
[17]Hart,O.Incomplete contracts and public ownership:remarks and an application to public-private partnerships[J].Eco-nomic Journal,2003,113:69-76.
[18]Grewal,B and Sheehan,P.The evolution of constitutional federalism in Australia:an incomplete contracts approach[R].CSES Working Paper,2003,22(11):11.
[19]Aghion,P et al.Incomplete social contracts[J].Journal of European Economic Association,,2003,1(1):38-67.
①段文斌和董林辉(2003)认为,对不完全契约理论与完全契约理论并不能进行一一对应的比较,因为两者“是侧重点不同的两种研究方法,对它们进行抽象的比较没有太大的实际意义”。他们还强调指出,目前只有极少数学者持这种观点。
②Hart强调的剩余控制权是对剩余控制的权力,有别于旧产权理论所强调的资产剩余收入索取权(钱颖一,1998)。
③Hart和Moore1999年发表的论文《论不完全契约之基础》(Foundations of Incomplete Contracts)以及《再论不完全契约之基础》(More Foundations of Incomplete Contracts)阐述了这种指责,并进行了理论充补。
④Tirole认为,三种因素的自由组合(C13+C23+C33=6种情况)是契约不完全性的来源,而不是强调各种因素本身的情况。
⑤Tirole(1999)还讨论了完全契约可以协商的第三种情况,本文为简便起见对之进行了省略,关于y=V/2的证明,也请参见原文。
[2]Al-Najjar,N I,Anderlini,L,and Felli,L.Indescribable events[J].Research in Economics,2004,58:3-30.
[3]Tirole,J.Incomplete contracts:where do we stand?[J].Econometrica,1999,67(4):741-781.
[4]Rasmusen,E B.Explaining incomplete contracts as the result of contract-reading costs[J].Advances in Economic Anal-ysis&Policy,2001,1(1):1-32.
[5]Segal,I.Complexity and renegotiation:a foundation for incomplete contract[J].Review of Economic Studies,1999,66:57-82.
[6]Maskin,E,and Tirole,J.Two remarks on the property-rights literature[J].Review of Economic Studies,1999,66:139-149.
[7]Zingales,L.Corporate governance[R].NBER Working Paper No.6309,1997:12-14.
[8]Maskin,E.On indescribable contingencies and incomplete contracts[J].European Economic Review,2002,46(4-5):725-733.
[9]Legros,P et al.Courts,contracts,and interference[J].European Economic Review,2002,46:734-744.
[10]Tirole,J.Corporate governance[J].Hitotsubashi University Econometrica,2001,69:1-35.
[11]Grubb,F.The statutory regulation of colonial servitude:an incomplete-contract approach[J].Explorations in Econom-ic History,2002,37:42-75.
[12]Matimort,D et al.An incomplete contract perspective on public good provision[J].Journal of Economic Surveys,2005,19(2):149-180.
[13]Mastern,S E and Saussier,S.Econometrics of contracts:an assessment of developments in the empirical literature oncontracting[A].In Brousseau,E and Glachant,J M(eds).The economics of contracts:theories and applications[C].Cambridge University Press,2002:273-292.
[14]Sacconi,L.Incomplete contracts and corporate ethics:a game theoretical model under fuzzy information[R].WorkingPapers No.91,Serie Etica,Dirittoed Ecomomica 1,2001:1-3.
[15]Bratton,W W and McCahery,J A.Incomplete contracts theories of the firm and comparative corporate governance[R].Working Papers,Center for Company Law.Tilburg University,2001:1-18.
[16]Bos,D.Privatization and restructuring:an incomplete-contract approach[J].JITE,1999,155:362-383.
[17]Hart,O.Incomplete contracts and public ownership:remarks and an application to public-private partnerships[J].Eco-nomic Journal,2003,113:69-76.
[18]Grewal,B and Sheehan,P.The evolution of constitutional federalism in Australia:an incomplete contracts approach[R].CSES Working Paper,2003,22(11):11.
[19]Aghion,P et al.Incomplete social contracts[J].Journal of European Economic Association,,2003,1(1):38-67.
①段文斌和董林辉(2003)认为,对不完全契约理论与完全契约理论并不能进行一一对应的比较,因为两者“是侧重点不同的两种研究方法,对它们进行抽象的比较没有太大的实际意义”。他们还强调指出,目前只有极少数学者持这种观点。
②Hart强调的剩余控制权是对剩余控制的权力,有别于旧产权理论所强调的资产剩余收入索取权(钱颖一,1998)。
③Hart和Moore1999年发表的论文《论不完全契约之基础》(Foundations of Incomplete Contracts)以及《再论不完全契约之基础》(More Foundations of Incomplete Contracts)阐述了这种指责,并进行了理论充补。
④Tirole认为,三种因素的自由组合(C13+C23+C33=6种情况)是契约不完全性的来源,而不是强调各种因素本身的情况。
⑤Tirole(1999)还讨论了完全契约可以协商的第三种情况,本文为简便起见对之进行了省略,关于y=V/2的证明,也请参见原文。
引用本文
苏启林, 申明浩. 不完全契约理论与应用研究最新进展[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2005, 27(9): 16–23.
导出参考文献，格式为：
上一篇：神经经济学探析
下一篇：西方政府—非营利组织关系理论综述
