政府产业重组规划、信号博弈与企业兼并行为
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财经研究 2009 年 第 35 卷第 11 期, 页码：72 - 79
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章以2009年我国腾中重工公司兼并通用公司"悍马"品牌为现实索引,为水平兼并不存在"整合效应"的负盈利资产提供两种基于信号博弈的理论解释。第一种解释基于限制性定价的思路,说明在成本信息不对称的企业进行产量竞争背景下和在一定的市场环境下,总会对应一定负盈利水平的资产,使得低成本类型企业宁愿选择收购非盈利资产,以向竞争者显示其成本类型而得益。另一种解释引入政府推进产业重组的因素,当高效重组不同成本类型企业的概率条件和资产负盈利水平满足一定条件时,存在使低成本类型企业选择收购非盈利资产,以避免在产业重组中可能被低效兼并的分离均衡。
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[2]泰勒尔.产业组织理论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,1997.
[3]Banks J,Sobel J.Equilibriumselection in signaling games[J].Econometrica,55(3):647-661.
[4]Cassing J,Ted T.Antidumping,signaling and cheap talk[J].Journal of International Economics,2008,75:373-382.
[5]Cho K,Kreps D.Signaling games and stable equilibria[J].Quarterly Journal of Eco-nomics,1987,102(2):179-221.
[6]Fauli-Oller R.Takeover waves[J].Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,2000,9:189-210.
[7]Fudenberg D,Tirole J.Game theory[M].Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,1991.
[8]Milgrom P,Roberts J.Li mit pricing and entry under incomplete information:An equi-libriumanalysis[J].Econometrica,1982,50;443-460.
[9]Milgrom P,Roberts J.Informational asymmetries,strategic behavior,and industrial organization[J].American Economic Review,1987,77(2):184-193.
[10]Motta M.Competition policy:Theory and practice[M].Cambridge Press,2004.
[11]Jeffrey C,Roger W.Industrial organization:Astrategic approach[M].Irwin,McGraw-Hill,2000.
[12]Salant W,Switzer S,Reynolds R.Losses from horizontal merger:The effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1983,98(2):185-199.
引用本文
罗云辉. 政府产业重组规划、信号博弈与企业兼并行为[J]. 财经研究, 2009, 35(11): 72–79.
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