管理层为何自愿披露劳动力成本上涨风险信息?——来自中国上市公司的经验证据
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财经研究 2013 年 第 39 卷第 10 期, 页码：93 - 107
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章通过选取我国九个劳动密集型行业,分析了上市公司管理层自愿披露劳动力成本上涨风险信息的动机和经济后果。结果表明:(1)业绩较差、董事长和总经理两职分离的民营上市公司管理层更愿意主动披露劳动力成本上涨风险信息,表明民营企业管理层可能通过自愿披露劳动力成本上涨风险信息来"解释"较差的业绩以满足考核要求;(2)自愿披露劳动力成本上涨风险的民营上市公司管理层薪酬较高,表明管理层通过自愿信息披露来获得较高的报酬;(3)管理层自愿披露劳动力成本上涨风险信息会降低公司市场价值,而且在国有企业与民营企业之间不存在显著差异,这说明劳动力成本上涨风险信息对于投资者的估值决策具有重要意义,而且投资者无法识别民营企业管理层的选择性信息披露行为。
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[21]Sivakumar K,Waymire G.Insider trading following material news events:Evidence from earnings[J].Financial Management,1994,23(1):23-32.
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[23]Xiao J Z,Yang H,Chow C W.The determinants and characteristics of voluntary internet based disclosures by listed Chinese companies[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2004,23(3):191-225.
[24]Wang K,Sewon O,Claiborne M C.Determinants and consequences of voluntary disclosure in an emerging market:Evidence from China[J].Journal of International Accounting,Auditing and Taxation,2008,17(1):14-30.
①央企高管的基本工资不超过上年度中央企业在岗职工平均工资的5倍,绩效工资的上限为高管基本年薪的3倍。
②Bai等(2006)发现,作为国有企业的最大股东,政府会从企业中转移财富以维持社会稳定。
③受篇幅的限制,有关行业选择的分析未在文中报告,感兴趣的读者可以向作者索取。
④事实上,我们无法通过式(1)来区分“解释”动机和受托责任的影响,但在下文实证结果证实管理层存在自愿披露劳动力成本上涨风险信息的“解释”动机后,劳动力成本指标反过来进一步支持“解释”动机。
⑤受篇幅的限制,内生性检验和稳健性检验的结果未在文中报告,感兴趣的读者可以向作者索取。
[2]陈冬华,范从来,沈永建,等.职工激励、工资刚性与企业绩效[J].经济研究,2010,(7):116-129.
[3]方军雄.高管权力与企业薪酬变动的非对称性[J].经济研究,2011,(4):107-120.
[4]刘凤委,孙铮,李增泉.政府干预、行业竞争与薪酬契约[J].管理世界,2007,(9):76-84.
[5]黎文靖,胡玉明.国企内部薪酬差距激励了谁?[J].经济研究,2012,(12):125-136.
[6]罗炜,朱春艳.代理成本与公司自愿性披露[J].经济研究,2010,(10):143-155.
[7]马忠,吴翔宇.金字塔结构对自愿性信息披露程度的影响:来自家族控股上市公司的经验验证[J].会计研究,2007,(1):44-50.
[8]辛清泉,谭伟强.市场化改革、企业业绩与国有企业经理薪酬[J].经济研究,2009,(11):68-81.
[9]张学勇,廖理.股权分置改革、自愿性信息披露与公司治理[J].经济研究,2010,(4):28-39.
[10]Aboody D,Kasznik R.CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate voluntary disclosures[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2000,29(1):73-100.
[11]Bai C,Lu J,Tao Z.The multitask theory of state enterprise reform:Empirical evidence from China[J].American Economic Review,2006,96(2):353-357.
[12]Beyer A,Cohen D,Lys T,et al.The financial reporting environment:Review of the recent literature[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,50(2-3):296-343.
[13]Healy P,Hutton A,Palepu K.Stock performance and intermediation changes surrounding sustained increases in disclosure[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,1999,16(3):485-520.
[14]Healy P,Palepu K.Information asymmetry,corporate disclosure,and the capital markets:A review of the empirical disclosure literature[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,31(1-3):405-440.
[15]Lang M,Lundholm R.Voluntary disclosure and equity offerings:Reducing information asymmetry or hyping the stock?[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2000,17(4):623-662.
[16]Marquardt C,Wiedman C.Voluntary disclosure,information asymmetry,and insider selling through secondary equity offerings[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,1998,15(4):505-537.
[17]Miller G.Earnings performance and discretionary disclosure[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2002,40(1):173-204.
[18]Myers S,Majluf N.Corporate financing and investment decisions:When firms have information that investors do not have[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1984,13(2):187-221.
[19]Nagar V,Nanda D,Wysocki P.Discretional disclosure and stock-based incentives[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2003,34(1-3):283-309.
[20]Noe C.Voluntary disclosures and insider transactions[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1999,27:305-326.
[21]Sivakumar K,Waymire G.Insider trading following material news events:Evidence from earnings[J].Financial Management,1994,23(1):23-32.
[22]Verrecchia R E.Essays on disclosure[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,32(1-3):97-180.
[23]Xiao J Z,Yang H,Chow C W.The determinants and characteristics of voluntary internet based disclosures by listed Chinese companies[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2004,23(3):191-225.
[24]Wang K,Sewon O,Claiborne M C.Determinants and consequences of voluntary disclosure in an emerging market:Evidence from China[J].Journal of International Accounting,Auditing and Taxation,2008,17(1):14-30.
①央企高管的基本工资不超过上年度中央企业在岗职工平均工资的5倍,绩效工资的上限为高管基本年薪的3倍。
②Bai等(2006)发现,作为国有企业的最大股东,政府会从企业中转移财富以维持社会稳定。
③受篇幅的限制,有关行业选择的分析未在文中报告,感兴趣的读者可以向作者索取。
④事实上,我们无法通过式(1)来区分“解释”动机和受托责任的影响,但在下文实证结果证实管理层存在自愿披露劳动力成本上涨风险信息的“解释”动机后,劳动力成本指标反过来进一步支持“解释”动机。
⑤受篇幅的限制,内生性检验和稳健性检验的结果未在文中报告,感兴趣的读者可以向作者索取。
引用本文
黎文靖, 杨丹. 管理层为何自愿披露劳动力成本上涨风险信息?——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J]. 财经研究, 2013, 39(10): 93–107.
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