CEO权力、私有收益与并购动因——基于我国上市公司的实证研究
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财经研究 2013 年 第 39 卷第 04 期, 页码：102 - 111
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章选取2002-2011年发生并购的上市公司为样本,研究了我国上市公司CEO权力、私有收益与并购动因之间的关系。研究发现,CEO权力和私有收益是企业并购的主要推动力,对企业并购与否、并购规模及并购频率具有重要影响;权力较大的CEO更可能推动并购,进而获得较高的私有收益。文章的研究体现了CEO通过权力推动并购进而获取私有收益的过程。
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[2]韩立岩,陈庆勇.并购的频繁程度意味着什么——来自我国上市公司并购绩效的证据[J].经济学季刊,2007,(4):1185-1200.
[3]卢锐,魏明海,黎文靖.管理层权力、在职消费与产权效率——来自中国上市公司的证据[J].南开管理评论,2008,(5):85-92.
[4]纳超洪.管理权力、自由裁量性投资与高管薪酬——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[D].暨南大学博士学位论文,2009.
[5]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010,(11):73-87.
[6]张鸣,郭思永.高管薪酬利益驱动下的企业并购——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].财经研究,2007,(12):103-113.
[7]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2004.
[8]Agrawal A,Jaffe J,Mandelker G.The post-merger performance of acquiring firms:Are-examination of an anomaly[J].Journal of Finance,1992,47(4):1605-1621.
[9]Cording M L,Christmann P J,BourgeoisⅢ.A focus on resources in M&A success:Aliterature review and research agenda to resolve two paradoxes[R].Working Paper,U-niversity of Virginia,2002.
[10]Goh L.Mergers and executive pay[R].Working Paper,SSRN.No.977838,2006.
[11]Grinstein Y,Hribar P.CEO compensation and incentives:Evidence from M&A bonu-ses[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2004,73(1):119-143.
[12]Jensen M C,Ruback R S.The market for corporate control:The scientific evidence[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1983,11(1-4):5-50.
[13]Moeller S B,Schlingemann F P,Stulz R M.Do shareholders of acquiring firms gainfrom acquisitions?[R].Working Paper,Ohio State University,2003.
[14]Moeller S B,Schlingemann F P,Stulz R M.Wealth destruction on a massive scale?Astudy of acquiring firm returns in the recent merger wave[J].Journal of Finance,2005,60(2):757-782.
[15]Mueller S B,Schlingemann F P,Stulz R M.A theory of conglomerate mergers[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1969,83(4):643-659.
[16]Scharfstein D S,Stein J C.The dark side of internal capital markets:Divisionalrent-seeking and inefficient investment[J].Journal of Finance,2000,55(6):2537-2564.
[17]Yermack D.Good timing:CEO stock option awards and company news announce-ments[J].Journal of Finance,1997,52(2):449-476.
引用本文
张洽, 袁天荣. CEO权力、私有收益与并购动因——基于我国上市公司的实证研究[J]. 财经研究, 2013, 39(4): 102–111.
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