专有化成本与公司自愿性信息披露——基于客户信息披露的分析
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财经研究 2014 年 第 40 卷第 12 期, 页码：27 - 38
摘要
参考文献
摘要
目前,国内尚无文献探讨客户信息这种特殊的自愿性披露内容,并实证检验自愿性信息披露的专有化成本假说。文章通过手工收集2007-2011年制造业A股上市公司的客户信息数据,探讨了专有化成本对公司客户信息披露决策的影响。结果表明:(1)专有化成本与客户信息自愿披露水平整体上显著负相关,即专有化成本越高,公司披露客户明细金额和具体名称的意愿越弱,尤其是不愿披露客户名称;(2)行业集中度越高、对客户的依赖性越强,披露客户信息的专有化成本就越高,公司也就越不愿披露客户详细信息;(3)资本市场收益会削弱专有化成本和客户信息披露水平之间的负相关关系,说明信息披露决策是权衡披露成本和收益后的结果。
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1 HHI=∑(xi/X)2,其中xi表示企业i的总资产规模,X=∑xi表示行业内所有企业的年度总资产规模总和。
2 CC=∑(Salei/TSale)2,其中Salei表示对每位客户的销售收入,TSale表示企业营业收入。
1在下文的分组回归中,由于分组后行业内企业数少于10的样本被剔除,CustSale和CC的样本数可能分别小于5 271和3 226。
[2]万鹏,曲晓辉.董事长个人特征、代理成本与营收计划的自愿披露——来自沪深上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2012,(7):15-23.
[3]张然,张鹏.中国上市公司自愿业绩预告动机研究[J].中国会计评论,2011,(1):369-384.
[4]张学勇,廖理.股权分置改革、自愿性信息披露与公司治理[J].经济研究,2010,(4):28-39.
[5]张宗新,张晓荣,廖士光.上市公司自愿性信息披露行为有效吗?——基于1998~2003年中国证券市场的检验[J].经济学(季刊),2005,(2):369-386.
[6]Allen J W,Phillips G M.Corporate equity ownership,strategic alliances,and product market relationships[J].Journal of Finance,2000,55(6):2791-2815.
[7]Arya A,Mittendorf B.Using disclosure to influence herd behavior and alter competition[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,40(1):231-246.
[8]Berger P G,Hann R N.Segment profitability and the proprietary and agency costs of disclosure[J].Accounting Review,2007,82(4):869-906.
[9]Botosan C A,Stanford M.Managers’motives to withhold segment disclosures and the effect of SFAS No.131on analysts’information environment[J].Accounting Review,2005,80(3):751-772.
[10]Core J.A review of the empirical disclosure literature:Discussion[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,31(1):441-456.
[11]Darrough M N.Disclosure policy and competition:Cournot vs.Bertrand[J].Accounting Review,1993,68(3):534-561.
[12]Darrough M N,Stoughton N M.Financial disclosure policy in an entry game[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1990,12(1):219-243.
[13]Ellis J A,Fee C E,Thomas S E.Proprietary costs and the disclosure of information about customers[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2012,50(3):685-727.
[14]Gosman M,Kelly T,Olsson P,et al.The profitability and pricing of major customers[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2004,9(1):117-139.
[15]Grossman S J.The informational role of warranties and private disclosure about product quality[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1981,24(3):461-483.
[16]Haushalter D,Klasa S,Maxwell W F.The influence of product market dynamics on a firm’s cash holdings and hedging behavior[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,84(3):797-825.
[17]Hayes R M,Lundholm R.Segment reporting to the capital market in the presence of a competitor[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1996,34(2):261-279.
[18]Healy P M,Palepu K G.Information asymmetry,corporate disclosure,and the capital markets:A review of the empirical disclosure literature[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,31(1):405-440.
[19]Hill M D,Kelly G W,Lockhart G B.Shareholder returns from supplying trade credit[J].Financial Management,2012,41(1):255-280.
[20]Hui K W,Klasa S,Yeung P E.Corporate suppliers and customers and accounting conservatism[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2012,53(1-2):115-135.
[21]Itzkowitz J.Customers and cash:How relationships affect suppliers’cash holdings[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2013,19(1):159-180.
[22]Johnson W C,Kang J K,Yi S.The certification role of large customers in the new issues market[J].Financial Management,2010,39(4):1425-1474.
[23]Jurgen P.Buyer market power and innovative activities[J].Review of Industrial Organization,2000,16(1):13-38.
[24]Kale J R,Shahrur H.Corporate capital structure and the characteristics of suppliers and customers[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,83(2):321-365.
[25]Milgrom P R.Good news and bad news:Representation theorems and applications[J].Bell Journal of Economics,1981,12(2):380-391.
[26]Patatoukas P N.Customer-base concentration:Implications for firm performance and capital markets[J].Accounting Review,2012,87(2):363-392.
[27]Verrecchia R E.Essays on disclosure[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,32(1):97-180.
[28]Verrecchia R E.Discretionary disclosure[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1983,5(1):179-194.
[29]Wagenhofer A.Voluntary disclosure with a strategic opponent[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1990,12(4):341-363.
1 HHI=∑(xi/X)2,其中xi表示企业i的总资产规模,X=∑xi表示行业内所有企业的年度总资产规模总和。
2 CC=∑(Salei/TSale)2,其中Salei表示对每位客户的销售收入,TSale表示企业营业收入。
1在下文的分组回归中,由于分组后行业内企业数少于10的样本被剔除,CustSale和CC的样本数可能分别小于5 271和3 226。
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王雄元, 喻长秋. 专有化成本与公司自愿性信息披露——基于客户信息披露的分析[J]. 财经研究, 2014, 40(12): 27–38.
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