管理层持股能减轻自愿性披露中的代理冲突吗?——以我国A股上市公司业绩预告数据为例
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财经研究 2013 年 第 39 卷第 11 期, 页码：124 - 134
摘要
参考文献
摘要
国内外文献从多个角度检验了管理层持股作为解决代理问题的重要手段之一的激励作用。文章以我国A股上市公司业绩预告为例,通过检验预告披露方式自愿性选择的影响来研究管理层持股对解决自愿性信息披露中代理问题的激励作用。结果发现,随着管理层持股比例和持股价值的提高,其自愿性选择的披露方式的精确性和及时性也随之提高,并更趋于稳健。结合股权分置改革的检验结果表明,改革后这一作用得到了进一步增强。总体上,文章的研究结果表明管理层持股在一定程度上能够减轻自愿性披露中的代理问题。
[1]高敬忠,周晓苏,王英允.机构投资者持股对信息披露的治理作用研究——以管理层盈余预告为例[J].南开管理评论,2011,(5):129-140.
[2]苏冬蔚,林大庞.股权激励、盈余管理与公司治理[J].经济研究,2010,(11):88-99.
[3]张海平,吕长江.上市公司股权激励与会计政策选择:基于资产减值会计的分析[J].财经研究,2011,37(7):60-70.
[4]Aboody D,Kasznik R.CEO stock option awards and the timing of voluntary corporate disclosures[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2000,29(1):73-100.
[5]Armstrong S,Jagolinzer A D,Larcker D F.Chief executive officer equity incentives and accounting irregularities[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2010,48(2):225-271.
[6]Balsam S,Jiang W,Lu B.Equity incentives and internal control weaknesses[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2012,Forthcoming.
[7]Benmelech E,Kandel E,Veronesi P.Stock-based compensation and CEO(Dis)incentives[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2010,125(4):1769-1820.
[8]Bhagat S,Tookes H.Voluntary and mandatory skin in the game:Understanding outside directors’stock holdings[J].The European Journal of Finance,2012,18(3-4):191-207.
[9]Cheng Q,Lo K.Insider trading and voluntary disclosures[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2006,44(5):815-848.
[10]Essid W.Executive stock options and earnings management:Is there an option level dependence?[J].Corporate Governance,2012,12(1):54-70.
[11]Healy P,K Palepu.Information asymmetry,corporate disclosure,and the capital markets:A review of the empirical disclosure literature[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,31(1-3):405-440.
[12]Kasznik R.On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1999,37(1):57-81.
[13]Nagar V,Nanda D,Wysocki P.Discretionary disclosure and stock-based incentives[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2003,34(1-3):283-309.
[14]Rogers J L,Stocken P C.Credibility on management forecasts[J].The Accounting Review,2005,80(4):1233-1260.
[15]Sengupta P,Zhang S.Equity-based compensation of outside directors and corporate information quality[R].Working Paper,http://ssrn.com/abstract=1858862,2011.
①尽管我们选取的样本中大多表现为管理层自愿性持股,但也可能包含部分因为股权激励计划而持有的股权,只是股权激励计划而持有的数量相对较小。
②Bhagat和Tookes(2012)发现,强制性股权持有与未来业绩无关,这与股权持有要求反映最优股权、最优持有水平一致。相反,自愿性持有与未来业绩显著正相关,意味着自愿持有发挥了对董事的激励作用。
[2]苏冬蔚,林大庞.股权激励、盈余管理与公司治理[J].经济研究,2010,(11):88-99.
[3]张海平,吕长江.上市公司股权激励与会计政策选择:基于资产减值会计的分析[J].财经研究,2011,37(7):60-70.
[4]Aboody D,Kasznik R.CEO stock option awards and the timing of voluntary corporate disclosures[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2000,29(1):73-100.
[5]Armstrong S,Jagolinzer A D,Larcker D F.Chief executive officer equity incentives and accounting irregularities[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2010,48(2):225-271.
[6]Balsam S,Jiang W,Lu B.Equity incentives and internal control weaknesses[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2012,Forthcoming.
[7]Benmelech E,Kandel E,Veronesi P.Stock-based compensation and CEO(Dis)incentives[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2010,125(4):1769-1820.
[8]Bhagat S,Tookes H.Voluntary and mandatory skin in the game:Understanding outside directors’stock holdings[J].The European Journal of Finance,2012,18(3-4):191-207.
[9]Cheng Q,Lo K.Insider trading and voluntary disclosures[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2006,44(5):815-848.
[10]Essid W.Executive stock options and earnings management:Is there an option level dependence?[J].Corporate Governance,2012,12(1):54-70.
[11]Healy P,K Palepu.Information asymmetry,corporate disclosure,and the capital markets:A review of the empirical disclosure literature[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,31(1-3):405-440.
[12]Kasznik R.On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1999,37(1):57-81.
[13]Nagar V,Nanda D,Wysocki P.Discretionary disclosure and stock-based incentives[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2003,34(1-3):283-309.
[14]Rogers J L,Stocken P C.Credibility on management forecasts[J].The Accounting Review,2005,80(4):1233-1260.
[15]Sengupta P,Zhang S.Equity-based compensation of outside directors and corporate information quality[R].Working Paper,http://ssrn.com/abstract=1858862,2011.
①尽管我们选取的样本中大多表现为管理层自愿性持股,但也可能包含部分因为股权激励计划而持有的股权,只是股权激励计划而持有的数量相对较小。
②Bhagat和Tookes(2012)发现,强制性股权持有与未来业绩无关,这与股权持有要求反映最优股权、最优持有水平一致。相反,自愿性持有与未来业绩显著正相关,意味着自愿持有发挥了对董事的激励作用。
引用本文
高敬忠, 周晓苏. 管理层持股能减轻自愿性披露中的代理冲突吗?——以我国A股上市公司业绩预告数据为例[J]. 财经研究, 2013, 39(11): 124–134.
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