The Dual Nature of Data Exchanges and the Construction of Regulatory Frameworks

Hou Liyang; Shi Wenyu

doi:doi:10.16538/j.cnki.jsufe.2026.04.009

Summary

Data exchanges in China are positioned as corporate market entities and should therefore meet the requirements of competition in the data circulation market. In the process of building a unified national market, however, data exchanges face a tension between their institutional design and functional positioning. China’s institutional construction of data exchanges has largely drawn on the model of stock exchanges. Yet data trading differs significantly from securities trading in terms of basic business operations, trading objects, and authority structures, giving rise to concerns that on-exchange regulatory powers may improperly expand into off-exchange transactions. In response, the regulatory paradigm for data exchanges should shift from a single model of self-regulation toward a more institutionalized paradigm of market regulation. To this end, it is necessary to re-examine the theoretical origins of the stock exchange system as a reference model and introduce the gatekeeper theory into China’s data exchange market. The rule-making framework of data exchanges should establish an internally and externally coordinated dual structure of “positive-negative” obligations, with positive obligations as the core. This structure should guide trading conduct, enhance market efficiency under fair competition, and promote the safe and orderly cultivation, expansion, and integration of the data market. The key distinction between internal positive obligations and external negative obligations lies in their respective regulatory functions. Internal positive obligations constitute the substantive core of regulation, emphasizing the self-restraint and structural optimization of data exchanges as gatekeepers of the on-exchange data factor market ecosystem. External regulation, by contrast, serves as a procedural guarantee and baseline constraint for internal obligations, reflected in the public authority’s recognition of gatekeeper qualifications, continuous supervision, and residual remedies when rules fail. External regulation should aim to ensure the implementation of internal obligations, thereby avoiding excessive public intervention in the dynamic operation of the data trading market. Accordingly, negative obligations should function as a constraint mechanism for external regulation, used to evaluate the implementation of obligations and the realization of the system’s ultimate objectives. Through the construction of this dual-layer obligation structure, data exchanges can effectively foster data circulation service institutions, accelerate the marketization and value realization of data factors, and achieve the expected goals of institutional design.