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4009The GM product labeling policy has an important impact on product pricing and consumer purchasing decisions. Through the comprehensive scientific research on the safety of genetically modified products, this paper finds that the scientific community has reached a consensus that consuming GM products will not bring greater health risks than similar traditional products. However, there are significant differences in the marking policies developed by the government. In view of this phenomenon, this paper attempts to construct a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium model including government, manufacturers and consumers under the framework of game theory, focusing on the government’s policy formulation basis（government position）and consumer group characteristics, so as to analyze the reasons for policy differences. Through the model solution, it is found that the group interests and consumer group characteristics that enter the policy objectives can explain the policy differences. When the government takes the maximization of consumer surplus as the policy goal, the optimal labeling policy is the voluntary labeling policy; when the government maximizes the profit of manufacturers as the policy goal, the optimal labeling policy is the mandatory labeling policy; when the government takes the largest total social welfare as the policy goal, the choice of optimal identification policy depends on the group characteristics of consumers. Finally, this paper explains this conclusion. The voluntary labeling policy leads to the reduction of product quality perceived by consumers, which intensifies the price competition among manufacturers, and compares and analyzes the empirical facts of national labeling policies. This paper also provides a relatively consistent interpretation framework for understanding the differences in labeling policy development.
/ Journals / Journal of Finance and Economics
Journal of Finance and Economics
LiuYuanchun, Editor-in-Chief
ZhengChunrong, Vice Executive Editor-in-Chief
YaoLan BaoXiaohua HuangJun, Vice Editor-in-Chief
The Same Science，Different Policies：Game Analysis of the Differences in the Labeling Policy of GM Products
Journal of Finance and Economics Vol. 46, Issue 04, pp. 63 - 78 (2020) DOI:10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.2020.04.005
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Cite this article
Yao Dongmin, Zhang Lei, Zhang Pengyuan. The Same Science，Different Policies：Game Analysis of the Differences in the Labeling Policy of GM Products[J]. Journal of Finance and Economics, 2020, 46(4): 63-78.
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