3551 
1820鉴于董事高管责任保险（以下简称董责险）可能通过管理层激励或外部监督等机制影响企业对外直接投资，本文使用中国A股上市公司2004—2018年海外子公司规模数据和2011—2018年海外子公司绩效数据分析了董责险对企业对外直接投资的影响。研究结果表明，董责险扩大了企业对外投资规模，表现为海外子公司数量的显著增加。此外，董责险有利于提高企业对外投资绩效，说明董责险的道德风险机制并非占主导地位。进一步检验发现，董责险对企业对外投资规模的促进效应在“一带一路”倡议提出之后更为显著，表明“一带一路”倡议能够强化董责险对企业对外投资规模的促进作用。作用机制检验显示，董责险通过增加企业风险承担和减少企业代理成本两条路径提升了企业对外直接投资水平，验证了董责险的管理层激励和外部监督机制，但缓解融资约束的机制并未被验证。本文的研究结论对在中国企业中推行董责险和更好开展对外直接投资具有积极的启示作用。
董事高管责任保险能否促进企业对外直接投资——基于A股上市公司的实证研究
摘要
参考文献
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引用本文
王天韵, 祝继高. 董事高管责任保险能否促进企业对外直接投资——基于A股上市公司的实证研究[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2024, 46(4): 36-51.
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