数据安全与企业间数据共享——基于不完全契约视角
Data Security and Inter-firm Data Sharing: A Perspective Based on Incomplete Contracts
DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.20260513.301
[1]任羽卓,杨瑞龙,王一兆.数据安全与企业间数据共享——基于不完全契约视角[J/OL].财经研究,2026,52(07):34-48[2026-11-11].https://doi.org/10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.20260513.301.
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摘要
企业间的数据共享是充分发挥数据潜在价值、提升社会整体福利的有效途径,然而数据安全问题却阻碍了企业的数据共享行为。在不完全契约的理论框架下,文章聚焦合作方的机会主义行为,分析由其引致的数据安全问题如何影响企业间的数据共享行为,得到以下主要结论:(1)数据共享能够降低最终产品定价并提高产出水平,实现数据共享双方联合利润的最大化;(2)数据安全问题导致的数据敲竹杠会削弱企业数据共享激励,阻碍企业的数据共享,进而降低数据共享量;(3)即使在存在数据敲竹杠的情况下,当最终产品对数据依赖度较低、竞争较为激烈以及专业化优势足够高时,企业仍会选择数据共享。此外,文章还发现,企业可通过采用数字安全技术、建立关系契约以及构建复杂交易网络的方式缓解数据共享不足的问题。文章拓展了数据安全与数据共享的相关研究,从理论层面揭示了数据共享不足的原因并提出了相应的解决方案,这对促进数据共享以及数据流通具有启示意义。
In the digital era, data has become a pivotal factor of production, and promoting inter-firm data sharing is a key avenue for unlocking data’s latent value and enhancing overall social welfare. However, data security issues—particularly those arising from partner opportunism—severely hinder such sharing. Therefore, it is of great significance to examine how data security issues induced by partner opportunism affect inter-firm data sharing and, on this basis, to propose corresponding countermeasures.
Drawing on the incomplete contract theory, this paper develops a business cooperation model that incorporates data sharing to analyze the impact of data security issues on inter-firm data sharing. In the theoretical framework, the non-rivalry nature of data and its low-cost replicability expose the data-sharing party to a “data hold-up” risk once the data is shared with a partner. This risk alters the sharer’s outside options and compels it to cede a portion of surplus to the partner. Theoretical analysis yields the following main conclusions: (1) Data sharing reduces final product pricing and improves output levels, thereby maximizing the joint profits for both parties in data sharing. (2) “Data hold-up” arising from data security issues dampens firms’ incentives to share data, impedes inter-firm data sharing, and consequently reduces the equilibrium volume of shared data. (3) Even in the presence of “data hold-up”, firms will still opt to share data when final products exhibit lower dependence on data, market competition is relatively intense, and specialization advantages are sufficiently strong.
To address the data-sharing dilemma, this paper proposes three feasible solutions: (1) mitigating contractual incompleteness through appropriate digital security technologies; (2) constraining partner opportunism via relational contracts; and (3) increasing the partner’s default costs by structuring complex trading networks. These approaches offer complementary theoretical rationales for promoting inter-firm data sharing.
This paper makes the following contributions: First, it examines impediments to inter-firm data sharing from the novel perspective of data security. Second, it elucidates the mechanisms of data security from the angles of contract design and enforcement, thereby providing a micro-foundation for understanding how data security shapes micro-level behavior. Third, it extends the application frontier of the incomplete contract theory to the domains of data security and data sharing, deepening the explanatory power of this theory in the digital era. The findings offer meaningful insights for advancing data circulation, improving data trading mechanisms, and achieving high-quality development of the digital economy.
关键词: 数据共享,数据安全,数据敲竹杠,不完全契约
参考文献
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