董事会正式、非正式结构对董事会会议频率的影响——非正式沟通对董事会行为强度的调节作用
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外国经济与管理 2015 年 第 37 卷第 04 期, 页码：
摘要
参考文献
摘要
本文基于委托代理理论、管家理论以及关系契约理论，以基尼系数作为董事会非正式层级清晰度，采用2010-2012年面板数据，验证深、沪两市上市公司董事会非正式层级清晰度对正式结构与会议频率的调节作用。结果发现：在不考虑非正式沟通时，董事长与总经理分离程度越高、董事会专业委员会设置程度越高，越需要召开更多的董事会会议以实现成员间的正式沟通；而当引入董事会非正式结构后，非正式层级清晰度负向调节两职设置和委员会设置对会议频率的正向影响。这意味着我国上市公司董事会成员的非正式沟通有助于缓解冲突、降低会议频率与治理成本。本研究的启发意义在于：在我国上市公司的资本市场约束力较低并存在差序格局的条件下，培养董事会成员间的信任关系、关注成员间的非正式沟通，将有助于降低董事会的治理成本。
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［34］牛建波，李胜楠.控股股东两权偏离、董事会行为与企业价值：基于中国民营上市公司面板数据的比较研究［J］.南开管理评论，2007，10（2）：31-37.
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［38］叶康涛，祝继高，陆正飞等.独立董事的独立性：基于董事会投票的证据［J］.经济研究，2011，（1）：126-139.
［2］Boyd B K，et al. Dimensions of CEOboard relations［J］.Journal of Management Studies，2011，48(8):1892-1923.
［3］Brick I E and Chidambaran N K. Board meetings，committee structure，and firm value［J］.Journal of corporate finance，2010，16(4)：533-553.
［4］Estrin S and Prevezer M. The role of informal institutions in corporate governance:Brazil,Russia,India，and China compared［J］.Asia Pacific journal of management，2011,28(1):41-67.
［5］Fama E F. Agency problems and the theory of the firm［J］.Journal of Political Economy，1980,88:287-307.
［6］Fama E F and Jensen M C. Separation of ownership and control［J］.Journal of Law and Economics，1983,26:301-326.
［7］Forbes D P and Milliken F J. Cognition and corporate governance:Understanding boards of directors as strategic decisionmaking groups［J］.Academy of Management Review，1999,24(3):489-505.
［8］Garg S. Venture boards: Distinctive monitoring and implications for firm performance［J］.Academy of Management Review，2013，38(1):90-108.
［9］Gould R. The origins of status hierarchies:A formal theory and empirical test［J］.American Journal of Sociology，2002，107(5):1143-1178.
［10］Gronn P. Distributed leadership as a unit of analysis［J］.The Leadership Quarterly，2002，13(4):423-451.
［11］He J and Huang Z. Board informal hierarchy and firm financial performance:Exploring a tacit structure guiding boardroom interactions［J］.Academy of Management Journal，2011,54(6):1119-1139.
［12］Hogg M A. A social identity theory of leadership［J］.Personality and social psychology review.2001，5(3):184-200.
［13］Huse M. Boardmanagement relations in small firms:The paradox of simultaneous independence and interdependence［J］.Small Business Economics，1994，6(1):55-72.
［14］Jensen M C and Meckling W H. Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior，agency costs and ownership structure［J］.Journal of Financial Economics，1976，3(4):305-360.
［15］Johnson S G，et al. Board composition beyond independence social capital，human capital，and demographics［J］.Journal of Management，2013，39(1):232-262.
［16］Machold S，et al. Board leadership and strategy involvement in small firms:A team production approach［J］.Corporate Governance:An International Review，2011,19(4):368-383.
［17］Macneil I R. The new social contract:An inquiry into modern contractual relations［M］.New Haven:Yale University Press，1980.
［18］Magee J C and Galinsky A D. Social hierarchy:The selfreinforcing nature of power and status［J］.The Academy of Management Annals，2008，(1):351-398.
［19］Neuberg S L and Newsom J T. Personal need for structure:Individual differences in the desire for simpler structure［J］.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology，1993，65(1):113-131.
［20］Ntim C G and Oseit K A. The impact of corporate board meetings on corporate performance in South Africa［J］.African Review of Economics and Finance，2011,2(2):83-103.
［21］Overbeck J R，et al. Internal status sorting in groups:The problem of too many stars［J］.Research on Managing Groups and Teams，2005，7:171-202.
［22］Peng M W and Heath P S. The growth of the firm in planned economies in transition:Institutions，organizations，and strategic choice［J］.Academy of Management Review,1996，21(2): 492-528.
［23］SchwartzZiv M and Weisbach M S. What do boards really do? Evidence from minutes of board meetings［J］.Journal of Financial Economics，2013，108(2):349-366.
［24］Shleifer A and Vishny R W. A survey of corporate governance［J］.Journal of Finance，1997，52(2): 737-783.
［25］Sonnenfeld J A. What makes great boards great［J］. Harvard business review，2002,80(9):106-113.
［26］Stiles P. The impact of the board on strategy:An empirical examination［J］.Journal of Management Studies，2001，38(5):627-650.
［27］Sundaramurthy C and Lewis M. Control and collaboration:Paradoxes of governance［J］.Academy of Management Review,2003,28(3):397-415.
［28］Tuggle C S，et al. Attention patterns in the boardroom:How board composition and processes affect discussion of entrepreneurial issues［J］.Academy of Management Journal，2010，53(3):550-571.
［29］Vafeas N. Board meeting frequency and firm performance［J］.Journal of Financial Economics，1999，53(1):113-142.
［30］郝云宏.公司治理内在逻辑关系冲突：董事会行为的视角［J］.中国工业经济，2012（9）：96-108.
［31］李国栋，薛有志.董事会战略参与效应及其影响因素研究［J］.管理评论，2011，23（3）：98-106.
［32］李建标，巨龙，李政等.董事会里的“战争”——序贯与惩罚机制下董事会决策行为的实验分析［J］.南开管理评论，2009(5)：70-76.
［33］宁家耀，王蕾.中国上市公司董事会行为与公司绩效关系实证研究［J］.管理科学，2008，21（2）：9-17.
［34］牛建波，李胜楠.控股股东两权偏离、董事会行为与企业价值：基于中国民营上市公司面板数据的比较研究［J］.南开管理评论，2007，10（2）：31-37.
［35］王鹏飞，周建.董事会战略介入模式研究——基于董事会能力的分析［J］.外国经济与管理，2011，33（12）：33-41.
［36］吴晓晖，娄景辉.独立董事对传统内部治理机制影响的实证研究——基于多元回归模型和Logistic模型的中国证据［J］.数量经济技术经济研究，2008(4)：142-152.
［37］谢永珍，徐业坤.基于股权结构与董事会治理视角的上市公司治理风险预警［J］.山东社会科学，2013，（4）：132-137.
［38］叶康涛，祝继高，陆正飞等.独立董事的独立性：基于董事会投票的证据［J］.经济研究，2011，（1）：126-139.
引用本文
谢永珍, 张雅萌, 张 慧, 等. 董事会正式、非正式结构对董事会会议频率的影响——非正式沟通对董事会行为强度的调节作用[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2015, 37(4): 0.
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