合约计量经济学研究综述
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外国经济与管理 2006 年 第 28 卷第 03 期, 页码：1 - 7
摘要
参考文献
摘要
合约理论是经济学前沿理论之一。然而,合约理论能否预测或解释实际合约这个问题一直没有受到经济学家的足够重视。合约计量经济学就是一个实证检验合约理论的新兴经济学分支。合约计量经济学已经对薪酬合约、分配合约、多任务合约、不完全合约和动态合约等进行了实证检验。本文对相关内容进行了评介。
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[7]Laffont,and Matoussi.Moral hazard,financial constraints and sharecropping contract[J].Review of Economic Studies,1995,62:381-399.
[8]Hanssen.The effect of a technological shock on contract form:revenue sharing in movie exhibition and the coming ofsound[J].Economic Inquiry,2002,40:168-192.
[9]Bandiera.On the structure of tenancy contracts:theory and evidence from 19th century rural Sicily[R].CEPR DiscussionPaper No.3032,October 2001.
[10]Holmstrom,and Milgrom.Multi-task principal-agent analyses:incentive contracts,asset ownership,and job design[J].The Journal of Law,Economics&Organization,1991,7(Sep.):24-52.
[11]Slade.Multi-task agency and contract choice:an empirical exploration[J].International Economic Review,1996,37:465-486.
[12]Joskow.Contract duration and relationship-specific investments:empirical evidence from coal markets[J].American E-conomic Review,1987,77:168-185.
[13]Monteverde,and Teece.Supplier switching costs and vertical integration in the automobile industry[J].Bell Journal ofEconomics,1982,13:206-213.
[14]Croker,and Renolds.The efficiency of incomplete contracts:an empirical analysis of air force engine procurement[J].Rand Journal of Economics,1993,24:126-146.
[15]Hubbard,and Weiner.How wide is the scope of hold-up-based theories?contractual form and market thickness in truc-king[R].NBER Working Papers No.7347,September 1999.
[16]Dionne,and Doherty.Adverse selection,commitment and renegotiation:extension to and evidence from insurance markets[J].Journal of Political Economy,1994,102:210-235.
[17]Margiotta,and Miller.Managerial compensation and the cost of moral hazard[J].International Economic Review,2000,(41):669-719.
[18]Harris,and Holmstrom.A theory of wage dynamic[J].Review of Economic Studies,1982,49:315-333.
[19]Chiappori,Salanie,and Valentin.Early starters vs.late beginners[J].Journal of Political Economy,1999,107:731-760.
[20]Hendel,and Lizzeri.The role of commitment in dynamic contracts:evidence from life insurance[R].NBER Working Pa-pers No.7470,January 2000.
引用本文
魏光兴, 蒲勇健. 合约计量经济学研究综述[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2006, 28(3): 1–7.
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