3796 
3829文章使用中国私营企业调查数据，实证研究了创业者的体制内关系对新创企业的创业规模和长期成长的影响及其作用机制。研究发现，拥有体制内关系的创业者不仅创业规模更大，而且创业后的净资产复合增长率也更高。进一步研究发现，与其他创业者的创业资金更多来源于个人积累不同，拥有体制内关系的创业者更有可能依靠银行贷款和国有企业改制等途径进行创业；同时，他们对政府出台的民营企业支持政策更为了解，也更有可能通过担任人大代表、政协委员或工商联领导等方式重新获得政治身份。文章还发现，创业者的体制内关系在金融业不发达地区的作用更大。文章揭示了体制内关系带来的创业不平等问题，为中国推行“大众创业、万众创新”的战略举措提供了有价值的政策启发。
体制内关系、创业规模与新创企业成长
摘要
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引用本文
赵阳, 吴一平, 杨国超. 体制内关系、创业规模与新创企业成长[J]. 财经研究, 2020, 46(7): 79-92.
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