基于成本信息缺失的VER政策与社会福利分析
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财经研究 2007 年 第 33 卷第 08 期, 页码：18 - 28
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章在贸易主体间成本信息缺失的基础上,重新探讨了VER的政策含义。研究结果发现,在本国对外国厂商成本信息缺失的情境下,若产品市场为Cournot竞争,则VER将对两国产生实质的影响:对出口国而言,不论其厂商为何种类型,此时的VER政策都是非自愿的;本国的福利变化则需视出口厂商的类型而定。而在Bertrand竞争下,VER只在出口厂商为高成本类型时方对出口国有利,且不论外国厂商为何种类型,VER皆无法使两国同时获利。
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[9]Lai P Y.On the equivalence of tariffs and quotas under incomplete information[J].Hi-totsubashi Journal of Economics,2003,44:15~22.
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[12]Qiu L.Opti mal strategic trade policy under asymmetric information[J].Journal of In-ternational Economics,1994,36:333~354.
[2]Anis A,T Ross.I mperfect competition and pareto-i mproving strategic trade policy[J].Journal of International Economics,1992,33:363~371.
[3]Brander J,B Spencer.Export subsidies andinternational market share rivalry[J].Journalof International Economics,1985,18:83~100.
[4]Collie D,M Hviid.Tariffs for a foreign monopolist under incomplete information[J].Journal of International Economics,1994,37:249~264.
[5]Harris R.Why voluntary export restraints are“Voluntary”[J].Canadian Journal of E-conomics,1985,18:799~809.
[6]Kolev D,Prusa T.Dumping and double crossing:The(In)effectiveness of cost-basedtrade policy under incomplete information[J].International Economic Review,2002,43(3):895~918.
[7]Krishna K.Trade restrictions as facilitating pratices[J].Journal of International Eco-nomics,1989,26:251~270.
[8]Krueger A.American trade policy:A tragedy in the making[M].Washington,D.C.:The AEI Press,1995.
[9]Lai P Y.On the equivalence of tariffs and quotas under incomplete information[J].Hi-totsubashi Journal of Economics,2003,44:15~22.
[10]Maggi G.Strategic Trade policy with endogenous mode of competition[J].American E-conomic Review,1996,86:237~258.
[11]Mai C,H Hwang.Why voluntary export restraints are voluntary:An extension.[J].Journal of Economics,1988,21:877~882.
[12]Qiu L.Opti mal strategic trade policy under asymmetric information[J].Journal of In-ternational Economics,1994,36:333~354.
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钱春海, 韩燕. 基于成本信息缺失的VER政策与社会福利分析[J]. 财经研究, 2007, 33(8): 18–28.
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