雇佣关系、剩余分割与企业的雇用效率
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财经研究 2007 年 第 33 卷第 03 期, 页码：114 - 123
摘要
参考文献
摘要
现阶段,围绕经济利益分配产生的民营企业劳资纠纷日渐增多,这使得规范分析民营企业内部的利益分配机制成为必要。基于契约框架,文章阐述了雇佣剩余的由来和剩余分割的必要性,剖析了雇佣关系、剩余分割与企业雇用效率①之间的逻辑关系、影响机理及均衡的实现机制,最终指出:雇佣剩余是雇佣关系存续的基础;分割剩余不仅是维系雇佣关系的内在要求,而且更有助于促进企业雇用效率的提高,这对企业的现时绩效和长远发展都具有根本性意义。
⑤社会心理学家已经基于公平理论对于“支付高工资促使工人产出更多”进行了有效性验证(Adam,1965;Mowday,1979等)。
⑧Jacob Mincer.Studies in Human Capital,Collected essays of Jacob Mincer,VolumeⅡ.Edward Elgar Publishing Li mited,1993.
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[2]Ronald G Ehrenberg,Robert S Smith.Modernlabor economics—Theory and public poli-cy[M].Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc.,1997.
[3]Alan S Blinder,Don H Choi.Ashred of evidence on theories of wage stickiness[J].TheQuarterly Journal of Economics,1990,105(4):1003~1015.
[4]David I,Levine.Fairness,markets,and ability to pay:Evidence from compensationexecutives[J].The American Economic Review,1993,83(5):1241~1259.
[5]Herbert A Si mon.Organizations and markets[J].Journal of Public Administration Re-search and Theory,1995,5(3):273~294.
[6]WB MacLeod,J M Malcomson.I mplicit contracts,incentive compatibility,and involun-tary unemployment[J].Econometrica,1989,57(2):447~480.
[7]Roy A D.The distribution of earnings and of individual output[J].Economic Journal,1950,60(239):489~505.
[8]Jovanovic B.Job-Matching and the theory of turnover[J].The Journal of Political Econ-omy,1979,87(5):972~990.
[9]Janet L Yellen.Efficiency wage models of unemployment[J].The American EconomicReview,1984,74(2):200~205.
[10]George A Akerlof.Gift exchange and Efficiency-Wage theory-four views[J].The A-merican Economic Review,1984,74(2):79~83.
[11]A Rubinstein.Perfect equilibriumin a bargaining model[J].Econometrica,1982,50(1):97~110.
[12]Robert MSolow.Alternative approaches to macroeconomic theory:Apartial view[J].The Canadian Journal of Economics.1979,12(3):339~354.
[13]Harvey Leibenstein.The theory of underemployment in backward economies[J].TheJournal of Political Economy,1957,65(2):91~103.
[14]姚先国,郭继强.论劳动力产权[J].学术月刊,1996,(6):46~51.
[15]博斯沃思,道金斯,斯特龙巴克.劳动市场经济学[M].北京:中国经济出版社,2003.
[16]青木昌彦.比较制度分析[M].上海:上海远东出版社,2001.
[17]王一江.政府干预与劳动者利益[J].比较,2004,(9):1~14.
⑧Jacob Mincer.Studies in Human Capital,Collected essays of Jacob Mincer,VolumeⅡ.Edward Elgar Publishing Li mited,1993.
[1]H Lorne Carmichael.Self-enforcing contracts,shirking,and life cycle incentives[J].TheJournal of Economic Perspectives,1989,3(4):65~83.
[2]Ronald G Ehrenberg,Robert S Smith.Modernlabor economics—Theory and public poli-cy[M].Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc.,1997.
[3]Alan S Blinder,Don H Choi.Ashred of evidence on theories of wage stickiness[J].TheQuarterly Journal of Economics,1990,105(4):1003~1015.
[4]David I,Levine.Fairness,markets,and ability to pay:Evidence from compensationexecutives[J].The American Economic Review,1993,83(5):1241~1259.
[5]Herbert A Si mon.Organizations and markets[J].Journal of Public Administration Re-search and Theory,1995,5(3):273~294.
[6]WB MacLeod,J M Malcomson.I mplicit contracts,incentive compatibility,and involun-tary unemployment[J].Econometrica,1989,57(2):447~480.
[7]Roy A D.The distribution of earnings and of individual output[J].Economic Journal,1950,60(239):489~505.
[8]Jovanovic B.Job-Matching and the theory of turnover[J].The Journal of Political Econ-omy,1979,87(5):972~990.
[9]Janet L Yellen.Efficiency wage models of unemployment[J].The American EconomicReview,1984,74(2):200~205.
[10]George A Akerlof.Gift exchange and Efficiency-Wage theory-four views[J].The A-merican Economic Review,1984,74(2):79~83.
[11]A Rubinstein.Perfect equilibriumin a bargaining model[J].Econometrica,1982,50(1):97~110.
[12]Robert MSolow.Alternative approaches to macroeconomic theory:Apartial view[J].The Canadian Journal of Economics.1979,12(3):339~354.
[13]Harvey Leibenstein.The theory of underemployment in backward economies[J].TheJournal of Political Economy,1957,65(2):91~103.
[14]姚先国,郭继强.论劳动力产权[J].学术月刊,1996,(6):46~51.
[15]博斯沃思,道金斯,斯特龙巴克.劳动市场经济学[M].北京:中国经济出版社,2003.
[16]青木昌彦.比较制度分析[M].上海:上海远东出版社,2001.
[17]王一江.政府干预与劳动者利益[J].比较,2004,(9):1~14.
引用本文
姚先国, 高怿. 雇佣关系、剩余分割与企业的雇用效率[J]. 财经研究, 2007, 33(3): 114–123.
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