民营化改革的所有权结构选择
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财经研究 2005 年 第 31 卷第 07 期, 页码：42 - 52
摘要
参考文献
摘要
现实中的产权改革是复杂的,存在许多介于纯公有企业与纯民有企业之间的中间形态,文章试图解释这些复杂现象,在不完全合同框架下,扩展了HSV模型,研究了剩余控制权与剩余索取权的不同配置效应,强调了所有权结构安排对管理者行为的约束和激励作用,认为所有权结构选择是社会福利与效率间的权衡问题。另外,文章还简单探讨了合同完全程度和市场竞争对所有权结构选择的影响。
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[3]GrossmanSanfordJ,HartOliverD.Thecostsandbenefitsofownership:Atheoryof verticalandlateralintegration[J].JournalofPoliticalEconomy,1986,(94):691～719.
[4]HartOliver,MooreJohn.Propertyrightsandthenatureofthefirm[J].JournalofPo liticalEconomy,1990,(98):1119～1158.
[5]HartO,ShleiferAi,VishnyRW.Theproperscopeofgovernment:Theoryandanap plicationtoprisons[J].TheQuarterlyJournalofEconomics,1997,November:1127～1161.
[6]MatsumuraT.Partialprivatizationinmixedduopoly[J].JournalofPublicEconomics,1998,(70):473～483.
[7]SappingtonDavidEM,StiglitzJosephE.Privatization,informationandincentives[R].NBERworkingpaper,1987,No.2196.
[8]SchmidtKM.Thecostsandbenefitsofprivatization:Anincompletecontractsapproach[J].TheJournalofLaw,Economics&Organization,1996a,(V12N1):1～23.
[9]SchmidtKM.Incompletecontractsandprivatization[J].EuropeanEconomicReview,1996b,(40):569～579.
[10]ShleiferA.Stateversusprivateownership[J].JournalofEconomicPerspectives,1998,(12):133～150.
[11]哈特.企业、合同与财务结构[M].上海:上海三联书店,1998.
[12]拉丰,梯若尔.政府采购与规制中的激励理论[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2004.
[13]孙群燕,李杰,张安民.寡头竞争情形下的国企改革———论国有股份比重的最优选择[J].经济研究,2004,(1):64～73.
引用本文
谢贞发. 民营化改革的所有权结构选择[J]. 财经研究, 2005, 31(7): 42–52.
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