中国银行体系关系型信贷的有效性——基于宣告效应的研究
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财经研究 2009 年 第 35 卷第 05 期, 页码：75 - 85
摘要
参考文献
摘要
在不对称信息下,关系型银行可以利用信息优势参与借款企业治理,降低代理成本。文章实证分析了1996-2008年中国上市公司发布获得银行信贷公告后的市场反应,发现上市公司发布获得银行授信和债务重组公告引起股价显著上涨,表明中国银行体系自1996年以来有意识地建立长期稳定的银企合作关系的政策具有治理效应。文章还发现,信息不对称程度越高、公司治理越差的公司,治理效应越显著。这种效应主要体现在贷前甄别企业质量和贷后救助方面,而在贷中监督企业机会主义行为,降低代理成本方面则没有体现。
③所有财务指标和公司治理指标都取之信贷公告上年末的数据。
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[1]青木昌彦,钱颖一.转轨经济中的公司治理结构——内部人控制和银行的作用[M].北京:中国经济出版社,1996.
[2]胡奕明,谢诗蕾.银行监督效应与贷款定价[J].管理世界,2005,(5):27-36.
[3]胡奕明,林文雄,李思琦,谢诗蕾.大贷款人角色:银行具有监督作用吗[J].经济研究,2008,(10):52-64.
[4]邓莉,张宗益,李宏胜.银行债权的公司治理效应研究[J].金融研究,2007,(1):61-70.
[5]雷英.银行监督与公司治理[M].上海:华东理工大学出版社,2007.
[6]沈洪波,张春,陈欣.中国上市公司银行贷款公告的信息含量[J].金融研究,2007,(12):154-164.
[7]Fama E.What’s different about banks[J].Journal of Monetary Economics,1985,15:29-36.
[8]Blair,Margaret.Ownership and control-rethinking corporate governance for the twentyfirst century[M].Washington D.C.:The Brookings Institution,1995.
[9]Diamond D W.Monitoring and reputation:The choice between bank loans and directlyplaced debt[J].Journal of Political Economy,1991,99:689-721.
[10]Steven S Byers,L Paige Fields,Donald R Fraser.Are corporate governance and bankmonitoring substitutes:Evidence fromthe perceived value of bank loans[J].Journal ofCorporate Finance,2008,14:475-483.
[11]James C.Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans[J].Journal of Financial Eco-nomics,1987,19:217-238.
[12]Slovin M,Johnson S,Glascock J.Firmsize and the information content of bank loanannouncements[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,1992,16:1057-1071.
[13]Ross,Stephen.The determination of capital structure:The incentive signaling approach[J].Journal of Economics,1997,8:23-40.
[14]Billett M,Flannery M,Garfinkel J.The effect of lender identity on a borrowing firm’sequity return[J].Journal of Finance,1995,50:699-718.
[15]Preece D C,Mullineaux DJ.Monitoring,loan renegotiability,and firmvalue:The roleof lending syndicates[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,1996,20:577-593.
引用本文
彭文平. 中国银行体系关系型信贷的有效性——基于宣告效应的研究[J]. 财经研究, 2009, 35(5): 75–85.
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