我国企业年金期权式管理费设计主张的效用分析
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财经研究 2009 年 第 35 卷第 03 期, 页码：28 - 38
摘要
参考文献
摘要
我国企业年金投资管理费制度是激励和约束投资管理人的重要因素。文章提出和设计了含有特定控制因素的期权式管理费制度,认为这种管理费制度可以使投资管理人和计划受益人的目标相一致,有利于敦促投资管理人自发控制年金基金的投资风险,并在此基础上提高年金基金的收益。这种期权式管理费制度设计,对于我国企业年金的健康发展具有重要意义。
①参见美国1970年对《1940投资顾问法》的修订。共同基金管理费制度近年来有一定程度的放松。
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[3]武凯.基金管理费制度安排的激励效应与优化选择[J].证券市场导报,2005,(8):33-37.
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[8]Heinkel R,Stoughton N M.The dynamics of portfolio management contracts[J].Re-viewof Financial Studies,1994,7(2):351-387.
[9]Huberman G,Kandel S.Ontheincentives for money managers:Asignalling approach[J].European Economic Review,1993,(37):1065-1081.
[10]Huddart S.Reputation and performance fee effects on portfolio choice by invest mentadvisers[J].Journal of Financial Markets,1999,2(3):227-271.
[11]Ross Stephen A.Compensation,incentives,and the duality of risk aversion and riski-ness[J].Journal of Finance,2004,59(1):207-225.
[12]Stracca Livio.Delegated portfolio management:Asurvey of the theoretical literature[J].Journal of economic surveys,2006,20(5):823-848.
[1]蔡明超,杨朝军.资产管理中报酬设计的困惑与对策[J].证券市场导报,2002,(4):62-65.
[2]韩立岩,谢朵.基于期权的资金信托违约风险度量[J].金融研究,2005,(3):109-119.
[3]武凯.基金管理费制度安排的激励效应与优化选择[J].证券市场导报,2005,(8):33-37.
[4]Carpenter Jennifer N.Does option compensation increase managerial risk appetite?[J].Journal of Finance,2000,(55):2311-2331.
[5]Das S R,SundaramR K.Fee speech:Signaling,risksharing,andthei mpact of fee structuresoninvestor welfare[J].Reviewof Economic Studies,2002,15(5):1465-1497.
[6]Elton EJ,MJ Gruber,C R Blake.Incentive fees and mutual funds[J].Journal of Fi-nance,2003,(58(2)):779-804.
[7]Ginblatt M,Tit man S.Adverse risk incentives and the design of performance basedcontracts[J].Management Science,1989,(35):807-822.
[8]Heinkel R,Stoughton N M.The dynamics of portfolio management contracts[J].Re-viewof Financial Studies,1994,7(2):351-387.
[9]Huberman G,Kandel S.Ontheincentives for money managers:Asignalling approach[J].European Economic Review,1993,(37):1065-1081.
[10]Huddart S.Reputation and performance fee effects on portfolio choice by invest mentadvisers[J].Journal of Financial Markets,1999,2(3):227-271.
[11]Ross Stephen A.Compensation,incentives,and the duality of risk aversion and riski-ness[J].Journal of Finance,2004,59(1):207-225.
[12]Stracca Livio.Delegated portfolio management:Asurvey of the theoretical literature[J].Journal of economic surveys,2006,20(5):823-848.
引用本文
史丹丹, 李曜. 我国企业年金期权式管理费设计主张的效用分析[J]. 财经研究, 2009, 35(3): 28–38.
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