资产剥离的合意性:基于消费者福利标准的分析
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财经研究 2010 年 第 36 卷第 12 期, 页码：107 - 117
摘要
参考文献
摘要
资产剥离作为一种重要的补救措施被反垄断当局广泛运用于横向兼并控制,然而对资产剥离有效性的理论研究却相对薄弱并充满争议,尤其是对资产剥离有效性的适用条件缺乏系统的理论分析。文章基于古诺模型对消费者福利审查标准下资产剥离的合意性进行了分析,得出如下结论:(1)在对称情形下,向竞争对手剥离任意数量大于零的资产均是合意的,而向潜在进入者剥离资产却会导致价格上涨,除非兼并可以产生资产组合效应扩大兼并实体的产能。(2)在不对称情形下,如果企业间的区别仅仅在于资产拥有量的不同,那么向潜在进入者剥离资产是不合意的;而如果企业的区别在于掌握的技术不同,那么向潜在进入者剥离资产似乎是一个相对占优的选择,除非潜在进入者的技术落后于市场上的在位者,没有能力进入市场成为一个活跃的竞争者。因此,资产剥离的有效性在很大程度上取决于能否寻找到合适的受让人。
[1]Perry和Porter(1985)的成本函数参见:Perry,M.K.,and Porter,R.H..Oligopoly and the incentive for horizontal merger.American Economic Review,1985,75:219-227.
[2]本文构造的成本函数与Motta和Vasconcelos(2005)的成本函数本质上是一致的。参见Motta,M.and Vasconcelos,H..Efficiency gains and myopic antitrust authority in a dynamic merger game.International Journal of Industrial Organization,2005,23:777-801.
[1]马西莫.莫塔.竞争政策——理论与实践[M].(沈国华译)上海:上海财经大学出版社,2006:213-223.
[2]Williamson O E.Economies as an antitrust defense:The welfare tradeoffs[J].Ameri-can Economic Review,1968,58(1):18-36.
[3]Compte O,Jenny F,Rey P.Capacity constraints,mergers and collusion[J].European Economic Review,2002,46:1-29.
[4]Cabral L.Horizontal mergers with free-entry:Why cost efficiencies may be a weak de-fense and asset sales a poor remedy[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2003,21:607-623.
[5]Parker R G,Balto D A.The evolving approach to merger remedies[J].Antitrust Re-port,2000,2:2-28.
[6]Aldo Gonzalez.Divestitures and the screening of efficiency gains in merger control[EB/OL].http://econ.uchile.cl/public/Archivos/pub/7c74cdc3-9cf9-4166-bd9f-72fc09f7dfe0.pdf.
[7]Cosnita A,Tropeano J P.Negotiating remedies:Revealing the merger deficiency gains[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2009,27:188-196.
[8]Foer Albert A.Toward guidelines for merger remedies[EB/OL].http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page-handle=hein.journals/cwrlrv52&div=16&g-sent=1.
[9]Motta M,Polo M,Vasconcelos H.Merger remedies in the European Union:An over-view[J].The Antitrust Bulletin,2007,52(3-4):603-631.
[2]本文构造的成本函数与Motta和Vasconcelos(2005)的成本函数本质上是一致的。参见Motta,M.and Vasconcelos,H..Efficiency gains and myopic antitrust authority in a dynamic merger game.International Journal of Industrial Organization,2005,23:777-801.
[1]马西莫.莫塔.竞争政策——理论与实践[M].(沈国华译)上海:上海财经大学出版社,2006:213-223.
[2]Williamson O E.Economies as an antitrust defense:The welfare tradeoffs[J].Ameri-can Economic Review,1968,58(1):18-36.
[3]Compte O,Jenny F,Rey P.Capacity constraints,mergers and collusion[J].European Economic Review,2002,46:1-29.
[4]Cabral L.Horizontal mergers with free-entry:Why cost efficiencies may be a weak de-fense and asset sales a poor remedy[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2003,21:607-623.
[5]Parker R G,Balto D A.The evolving approach to merger remedies[J].Antitrust Re-port,2000,2:2-28.
[6]Aldo Gonzalez.Divestitures and the screening of efficiency gains in merger control[EB/OL].http://econ.uchile.cl/public/Archivos/pub/7c74cdc3-9cf9-4166-bd9f-72fc09f7dfe0.pdf.
[7]Cosnita A,Tropeano J P.Negotiating remedies:Revealing the merger deficiency gains[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2009,27:188-196.
[8]Foer Albert A.Toward guidelines for merger remedies[EB/OL].http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page-handle=hein.journals/cwrlrv52&div=16&g-sent=1.
[9]Motta M,Polo M,Vasconcelos H.Merger remedies in the European Union:An over-view[J].The Antitrust Bulletin,2007,52(3-4):603-631.
引用本文
张曦, 周方召. 资产剥离的合意性:基于消费者福利标准的分析[J]. 财经研究, 2010, 36(12): 107–117.
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