制度效率、家族化途径与家族投资偏好
财经研究 2011 年 第 37 卷第 12 期, 页码:109 - 119
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章以家族企业投资决策为研究对象,考察了转轨与新兴双重特征下家族控制影响企业投资决策的机理。研究发现,家族控制人的风险规避偏好在投资决策中占主导,家族企业的长期投资规模小于非家族企业,其偏好于实体资本投资而限制高风险的R&D投资活动;家族风险规避偏好的短期投资行为在通过并购重组实现家族控制和职业经理人担任CEO的家族企业中更为显著;较高的制度效率可以减少家族控制人的风险规避动机,促进企业投资活动增加。
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[3]罗婷,朱青,李丹.解析R&D投入和公司价值之间的关系[J].金融研究,2009,(6):100-110.
[4]苏启林,朱文.上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J].经济研究,2003,(8):36-45.
[5]王明琳,周生春.控制性家族类型、双重三层委托代理问题与企业价值[J].管理世界,2006,(8):83-103.
[6]夏立军,方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005,(5):40-51.
[7]Aboody D,Lev B.Information asymmetry,R&D,and insider gains[J].Journal of Fi-nance,2000,55:2747-2766.
[8]Amit R,Ding Y,Villalonga B,et al.The role of institutional development in the prev-alence and value of family firms[R].Working Paper,2009.
[9]Anderson R,Reeb D.Founding-family ownership,corporate diversification,and firmleverage[J].Journal of Law and Economics,2003,46:653-684.
[10]Chan L K C,Lakonishok J,Sougiannis T.The stock market valuation of research anddevelopment expenditures[J].Journal of Finance,2001,56:2431-2456.
[11]Chen S,Chen X,Cheng Q.Do Family firms provide more or less voluntary disclo-sure?[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2008,46:499-536.
[12]Fahlenbrach R.Founder-CEOs,investment decisions,and stock market performance[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2009,44:439-466.
[13]Villalonga B,Amit R.How do family ownership,control,and management affectfirm value?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,80:385-417.
[14]Villalonga B,Amit R.Family control of firms and industries[J].Financial Manage-ment,2010,39:863-904.
引用本文
陈德球, 钟昀珈. 制度效率、家族化途径与家族投资偏好[J]. 财经研究, 2011, 37(12): 109–119.
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