审计师的地理位置与审计定价策略
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财经研究 2014 年 第 40 卷第 09 期, 页码：121 - 132
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章从经济地理视角研究了审计师的地缘优势及其审计溢价问题,并利用中国上市公司2008-2011年的数据考察了审计师地理位置所带来的审计收费差距。研究发现,由于缺乏地缘优势,审计师对偏远客户的审计收费显著低于临近客户;具有行业专长的审计师有更大的定价空间,对偏远客户降低审计收费的幅度更大;由于向外地拓展市场的动机强烈,审计师对偏远客户降低审计收费主要存在于审计竞争程度较高的市场中。这些结果说明审计师的地理位置影响了其议价能力和定价策略,而审计师定价空间和审计市场竞争则加剧了地理位置对审计定价的影响。文章的研究结论可以为相关监管部门规范审计市场行为提供有益的参考。
[1]陈冬华,周春泉.自选择问题对审计收费的影响——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].财经研究,2006,(3):44-55.
[2]刘峰,张立民,雷科罗.我国审计市场制度安排与审计质量需求——中天勤客户流向的案例分析[J].会计研究,2002,(12):22-27.
[3]刘文军.审计师的地理位置是否影响审计质量?[J].审计研究,2014,(1):79-87.
[4]江轩宇,尹志宏.审计行业专长与股价崩盘风险[J].中国会计评论,2013,(2):133-150.
[5]夏立军.政府干预与市场失灵——上市公司之会计师事务所选择研究[D].上海:上海财经大学,2005.
[6]谢盛纹.最终控制人性质、审计行业专业性与控股股东代理成本——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].审计研究,2011,(3):64-73.
[7]吴溪,张俊生.中国本土会计师事务所的市场地位与经济回报[J].会计研究,2012,(7):80-88.
[8]张立民,管劲松.我国A股审计市场的结构研究——来自2002上市公司年度报告的数据[J].审计研究,2004,(5):31-36.
[9]张奇峰.政府管制提高会计师事务所声誉吗?——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].管理世界,2005,(12):14-23.
[10]Agarwal S,Hauswald R.Distance and private information in lending[J].Review of Financial Studies,2010,23(7):2757-2778.
[11]Ayers B C,Ramalingegowda S,Yeung P E.Hometown advantage:The effects of monitoring institution location on financial reporting discretion[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2011,52(1):41-61.
[12]Baik B,Kang J K,Kim J M.Local institutional investors,information asymmetries,and equity returns[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,97(1):81-106.
[13]Cabán-García M T,Cammack S E.Industry and city-level audit market concentration[J].International Journal of Auditing,2011,15(1):21-42.
[14]Casterella J,Francis J,Lewis B,et al.Auditor industry specialization,client bargaining power,and audit pricing[J].Auditing:A Journal of Practice&Theory,2004,23(1):123-141.
[15]Chhaochharia V,Kumar A,Niessen-Ruenzi A.Local investors and corporate governance[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2012,54(1):42-67.
[16]Chan K H,Lin K Z,Mo P L.A political economic analysis of auditor reporting and auditor switches[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2006,11(1):21-48.
[17]Choi J H,Kim J B,Qiu A A,et al.Geographic proximity between auditor and client:How does it impact audit quality?[J].Auditing:A Journal of Practice&Theory,2012,31(2):43-72.
[18]Coval J,Moskowitz T.The geography of investment:Informed trading and asset prices[J].Journal of Political Economy,2001,109(4):811-841.
[19]DeFond M,Francis J R,Hu X.The geography of SEC enforcement and auditor reporting for financially distressed clients[R].Working Paper,University of Southern California,2011.
[20]DeFond M,Wong T J,Li S.The impact of improved auditor independence on audit market concentration in China[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1999,28(3):269-305.
[21]Degryse H,Ongena S.Distance,lending relationships,and competition[J].Journal of Finance,2005,60(1):231-266.
[22]General Accounting Office.Audits of public companies:Continued concentration in audit market for large public companies does not call for immediate action[C].Washington,D.C.:United States Government Accountability Office,2008.
[23]Ghoul S E,Guedhami O,Ni Y,et al.Does information asymmetry matter to equity pricing?Evidence from firms’geographic location[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2013,30(1):140-181.
[24]He X,Pittman J,Rui O M,et al.Do social ties between external auditors and audit committee members affect audit quality?[R].Working Paper,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,2014.
[25]Kallapur S,Sankaraguruswamy S,Zang Y.Audit market concentration and audit quality[R].Working Paper,Indian School of Business,National University of Singapore,Singapore Management University,2010.
[26]Kedia S,Rajgopal S.Do the SEC’s enforcement preferences affect corporate misconduct?[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2011,51(3):259-278.
[27]Kim J B,Liu X,Zheng L.The Impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on audit fees:Theory and evidence[J].The Accounting Review,2012,87(6):2061-2094.
[28]Malloy C.The geography of equity analysts[J].Journal of Finance,2005,60(2):719-755.
[29]Newton N J,Wang D,Wilkins M S.Does a lack of choice lead to lower quality?Evidence from auditor competition and client restatements[J].Auditing:A Journal of Practice&Theory,2013,32(3):31-67.
[30]Numan W,Willekens M.An empirical test of spatial competition in the audit market[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2012,53(1-2):450-465.
[31]Simunic D.The Pricing of audit services:Theory and evidence[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1980,18(1):161-190.
[32]Wang Q,Wong T J,Xia L.State ownership,the institutional environment,and auditor choice:Evidence from China[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2008,46(1):112-134.
1我们没有将事务所合并而形成的会计师事务所更换视作审计师变更。
1我们同时按照150公里和200公里进行划分,研究结论没有实质性变化。
2衡量审计市场竞争程度最常用的两种方法为行业层面和区域层面度量法(Cabán-García和Cammack,2011)。前者的具体方法是计算某个行业中,各个事务所市场份额的赫芬达尔指数。后者的具体方法是计算各个事务所在区域内审计市场份额的赫芬达尔指数。先前研究审计市场集中度的文献主要基于美国审计市场,Kallapur等(2010)和Newton等(2013)采用区域层面的衡量方法,而GAO(2008)则采用行业层面的衡量方法。区域层面衡量审计市场竞争程度的主要依据是审计市场具有明显的区域性特征。比如,Choi等(2012)发现在美国审计市场有80%的客户位于与审计师相同的大都市统计区(Metropolitan Statistical Area,MSA),有83%的客户距离审计师100公里以内。可以看出,美国审计市场呈现出明显的区域性特征。而根据我们的统计研究,在中国审计市场审计师与客户在同一个省份的比例约为53.84%,100公里以内的客户也仅为45%。可见,审计师在中国呈现出明显的跨区域承揽业务的特征,并不具有明显的区域性。因此,我们采用行业层面衡量审计市场竞争程度的方法。
1赫芬达尔指数介于0到1之间,值越大表示市场集中度越高,竞争越不激烈。为了更好地对比审计行业竞争对审计师对偏远和临近客户审计收费的影响,我们取上四分位和下四分位两个较为极端的部分作为样本。
2国内学术研究一般将会计师事务所分为“十大”和“非十大”,由于十大会计师事务所包括“国际四大”,而我们在研究样本中剔除了“国际四大”,因此我们将事务所分为“六大”和“非六大”。对国内“六大”和“非六大”(会计师事务所)的分类是根据中国注册会计师协会网站每年公布的百强事务所排名。
1这与He等(2014)的发现部分相吻合,He等(2014)也发现存货比例越高的公司审计收费越低。
[2]刘峰,张立民,雷科罗.我国审计市场制度安排与审计质量需求——中天勤客户流向的案例分析[J].会计研究,2002,(12):22-27.
[3]刘文军.审计师的地理位置是否影响审计质量?[J].审计研究,2014,(1):79-87.
[4]江轩宇,尹志宏.审计行业专长与股价崩盘风险[J].中国会计评论,2013,(2):133-150.
[5]夏立军.政府干预与市场失灵——上市公司之会计师事务所选择研究[D].上海:上海财经大学,2005.
[6]谢盛纹.最终控制人性质、审计行业专业性与控股股东代理成本——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].审计研究,2011,(3):64-73.
[7]吴溪,张俊生.中国本土会计师事务所的市场地位与经济回报[J].会计研究,2012,(7):80-88.
[8]张立民,管劲松.我国A股审计市场的结构研究——来自2002上市公司年度报告的数据[J].审计研究,2004,(5):31-36.
[9]张奇峰.政府管制提高会计师事务所声誉吗?——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].管理世界,2005,(12):14-23.
[10]Agarwal S,Hauswald R.Distance and private information in lending[J].Review of Financial Studies,2010,23(7):2757-2778.
[11]Ayers B C,Ramalingegowda S,Yeung P E.Hometown advantage:The effects of monitoring institution location on financial reporting discretion[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2011,52(1):41-61.
[12]Baik B,Kang J K,Kim J M.Local institutional investors,information asymmetries,and equity returns[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,97(1):81-106.
[13]Cabán-García M T,Cammack S E.Industry and city-level audit market concentration[J].International Journal of Auditing,2011,15(1):21-42.
[14]Casterella J,Francis J,Lewis B,et al.Auditor industry specialization,client bargaining power,and audit pricing[J].Auditing:A Journal of Practice&Theory,2004,23(1):123-141.
[15]Chhaochharia V,Kumar A,Niessen-Ruenzi A.Local investors and corporate governance[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2012,54(1):42-67.
[16]Chan K H,Lin K Z,Mo P L.A political economic analysis of auditor reporting and auditor switches[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2006,11(1):21-48.
[17]Choi J H,Kim J B,Qiu A A,et al.Geographic proximity between auditor and client:How does it impact audit quality?[J].Auditing:A Journal of Practice&Theory,2012,31(2):43-72.
[18]Coval J,Moskowitz T.The geography of investment:Informed trading and asset prices[J].Journal of Political Economy,2001,109(4):811-841.
[19]DeFond M,Francis J R,Hu X.The geography of SEC enforcement and auditor reporting for financially distressed clients[R].Working Paper,University of Southern California,2011.
[20]DeFond M,Wong T J,Li S.The impact of improved auditor independence on audit market concentration in China[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1999,28(3):269-305.
[21]Degryse H,Ongena S.Distance,lending relationships,and competition[J].Journal of Finance,2005,60(1):231-266.
[22]General Accounting Office.Audits of public companies:Continued concentration in audit market for large public companies does not call for immediate action[C].Washington,D.C.:United States Government Accountability Office,2008.
[23]Ghoul S E,Guedhami O,Ni Y,et al.Does information asymmetry matter to equity pricing?Evidence from firms’geographic location[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2013,30(1):140-181.
[24]He X,Pittman J,Rui O M,et al.Do social ties between external auditors and audit committee members affect audit quality?[R].Working Paper,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,2014.
[25]Kallapur S,Sankaraguruswamy S,Zang Y.Audit market concentration and audit quality[R].Working Paper,Indian School of Business,National University of Singapore,Singapore Management University,2010.
[26]Kedia S,Rajgopal S.Do the SEC’s enforcement preferences affect corporate misconduct?[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2011,51(3):259-278.
[27]Kim J B,Liu X,Zheng L.The Impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on audit fees:Theory and evidence[J].The Accounting Review,2012,87(6):2061-2094.
[28]Malloy C.The geography of equity analysts[J].Journal of Finance,2005,60(2):719-755.
[29]Newton N J,Wang D,Wilkins M S.Does a lack of choice lead to lower quality?Evidence from auditor competition and client restatements[J].Auditing:A Journal of Practice&Theory,2013,32(3):31-67.
[30]Numan W,Willekens M.An empirical test of spatial competition in the audit market[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2012,53(1-2):450-465.
[31]Simunic D.The Pricing of audit services:Theory and evidence[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1980,18(1):161-190.
[32]Wang Q,Wong T J,Xia L.State ownership,the institutional environment,and auditor choice:Evidence from China[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2008,46(1):112-134.
1我们没有将事务所合并而形成的会计师事务所更换视作审计师变更。
1我们同时按照150公里和200公里进行划分,研究结论没有实质性变化。
2衡量审计市场竞争程度最常用的两种方法为行业层面和区域层面度量法(Cabán-García和Cammack,2011)。前者的具体方法是计算某个行业中,各个事务所市场份额的赫芬达尔指数。后者的具体方法是计算各个事务所在区域内审计市场份额的赫芬达尔指数。先前研究审计市场集中度的文献主要基于美国审计市场,Kallapur等(2010)和Newton等(2013)采用区域层面的衡量方法,而GAO(2008)则采用行业层面的衡量方法。区域层面衡量审计市场竞争程度的主要依据是审计市场具有明显的区域性特征。比如,Choi等(2012)发现在美国审计市场有80%的客户位于与审计师相同的大都市统计区(Metropolitan Statistical Area,MSA),有83%的客户距离审计师100公里以内。可以看出,美国审计市场呈现出明显的区域性特征。而根据我们的统计研究,在中国审计市场审计师与客户在同一个省份的比例约为53.84%,100公里以内的客户也仅为45%。可见,审计师在中国呈现出明显的跨区域承揽业务的特征,并不具有明显的区域性。因此,我们采用行业层面衡量审计市场竞争程度的方法。
1赫芬达尔指数介于0到1之间,值越大表示市场集中度越高,竞争越不激烈。为了更好地对比审计行业竞争对审计师对偏远和临近客户审计收费的影响,我们取上四分位和下四分位两个较为极端的部分作为样本。
2国内学术研究一般将会计师事务所分为“十大”和“非十大”,由于十大会计师事务所包括“国际四大”,而我们在研究样本中剔除了“国际四大”,因此我们将事务所分为“六大”和“非六大”。对国内“六大”和“非六大”(会计师事务所)的分类是根据中国注册会计师协会网站每年公布的百强事务所排名。
1这与He等(2014)的发现部分相吻合,He等(2014)也发现存货比例越高的公司审计收费越低。
引用本文
刘文军. 审计师的地理位置与审计定价策略[J]. 财经研究, 2014, 40(9): 121–132.
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