4914 
7596诸多并购质量问题产生的根源在于并购双方之间的信息不对称，而通过特定信息渠道降低并购过程中的不确定性将有助于改善并购质量。虽然现有研究注意到董事联结是并购活动中的一种信息传递机制，但其作用相对有限。鉴于此，文章利用我国券商上市形成的准自然实验情境，关注共同分析师在并购双方之间的信息传递如何影响并购质量。研究发现：（1）在券商上市之后，相比不受券商上市影响的公司，那些由上市券商提供分析师服务的公司获得的短期并购绩效显著更高。（2）共同分析师在并购活动中的信息中介效应依赖于交易双方其他替代性信息传递渠道，当不存在共同董事或共同审计师来降低并购活动中的不确定性和信息不对称时，共同分析师对并购绩效的改善作用更加明显。（3）共同分析师提升并购绩效的价值驱动来自并购项目的盈利性而非较低的并购溢价。文章提供了共同分析师与并购绩效之间因果关系的经验证据，这对于理解信息中介如何影响公司财务决策及并购质量具有一定的意义。
共同分析师与公司并购——基于券商上市的准自然实验证据
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参考文献
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引用本文
马慧. 共同分析师与公司并购——基于券商上市的准自然实验证据[J]. 财经研究, 2019, 45(2): 113-125.
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