Based on the sample data of Listed Companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2017, this paper focuses on the impact of the government’s salary limit policy on the improvement of total factor productivity（TFP）of state-owned enterprises. The results show that: The three salary limit policies have significantly inhibited the promotion of TFP in state-owned enterprises; at the same time, when examining the scale difference, it is found that the “Salary Limit Order” in 2009 and the “Eight Regulations” in 2012 have a significant negative effect on TFP in state-owned enterprises, but the 2014 salary limit policy has only significantly inhibited TFP in small sample companies; when investigating the growth difference, it is found that the inhibition effect of 2009 and 2014 salary limit policies on the promotion of TFP of the sample companies with better growth is more obvious, while the inhibition effect of 2012 “Eight Regulations” on TFP of the group with higher growth is significantly consistent with that of the group with lower growth.
The possible contributions of this paper are as follows: It lays a theoretical foundation for the study of the economic consequences of the salary limit policy, and provides a methodological reference; it provides a new perspective for the study of the economic consequences of the government’s salary limit policy for state-owned enterprises, and reveals more comprehensively the rationality and effectiveness behind the “Salary Limit Order” and the impact of macro policies on micro enterprises; it shows the differences of the influence of cross-section differences on TFP of state-owned enterprises, and provides necessary theoretical reference for the government to study the influence of the pay limit policy on TFP of state-owned enterprises from multiple aspects and perspectives.
The enlightenment of this paper is that: The government should balance the salary limit with stimulating the enthusiasm and creativity of senior managers. While weakening the salary incentive, it should strengthen the promotion incentive and equity incentive of senior managers; while limiting the salary of senior managers in state-owned enterprises, it should strengthen the restriction and supervision of the board of directors, the board of supervisors and the relevant internal committee of enterprises on the financial decision-making of senior managers, especially the long-term development of enterprises. In order to improve the incentive strategy of state-owned enterprise executives, it should also consider the differences of enterprise scale and growth when evaluating the economic consequences of the salary limit policy.