On the basis of local governments'competition development and land institutions, this paper analyzes how local governments as land supply monopolists satisfy their competitive development behavior through a systematic land supply strategy set, and resulting urban land use growth. Using panel data at provincial level from 2006 to 2012, this paper completes the empirical test and proves the working hypotheses. Then it draws the conclusions as follows: because of local governments'land supply strategy set serving their competitive development behavior, the urban land use growth can be divided into two different aspects; urban land used in the second industry is supplied at a very low price to realize the maximization of attracting more investment & enterprises and developing industrialization; urban land used in business realizes the maximization of land finance through the self-cycle between urban construction investment and land price rise and cross-period land mortgage & transfer decisions, and its finance profits are used to subsidize the low-price supply of the land used in the second industry. Local governments coordinate the second-industry and business land use to achieve the maximization of fiscal & amp; tax expansion and economic growth. Under the development mode depending on land resources, the civilization supply of local farmers and migrant workers by local governments is in accordance with the direct contribution to land expansion rather than their own civilization willingness and needs, further resulting in the distortion of urban population growth. Therefore, the core of the governance of problems of urban land use growth in China lies in the reduction in government intervention in land resources allocation, the advancement of the marketization of land resources allocation, the transformation of development mode depending on land resources, and the promotion of people-oriented urban growth.