经济责任审计、代理成本与国有企业现金持有

Economic Responsibility Audit, Agency Costs, and State-owned Enterprises’ Cash Holdings

程博,蔡云霏

2024 第 26 卷 第 05 期 页码 107-121

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.jsufe.2024.05.008

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摘要

经济责任审计紧扣国有资产的管理、分配和使用,强化对权力运行的制约和监督,对督促国有企业领导人员规范权力行使、发挥国家审计治理功能具有重大意义。文章以2019年《经济责任审计新规》的实施为准自然实验,利用2016—2021年中国沪深A股上市公司的数据,考察了经济责任审计对国有企业现金持有的影响、作用机制及其经济后果。实证结果表明,《经济责任审计新规》实施之后的国有企业现金持有水平平均降低了16.07%。进一步检验发现,经济责任审计通过降低代理成本进而减少现金持有,并最终提升公司价值。横截面检验发现,当企业机构投资者持股比例高、外部审计质量高、管理层晋升动机强时,经济责任审计与国有企业现金持有水平的负相关关系更为明显。文章提供了经济责任审计与国有企业现金持有水平之间因果关系的经验证据,对探究国有企业治理问题,实现国有资产保值增值、提质增效具有一定的启示意义。

Economic responsibility audit focuses on the management, allocation, and use of state-owned assets, strengthens the constraints and supervision of power operation, and has significant significance in urging leaders of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to regulate the exercise of power and play the role of national audit governance. Taking the implementation of the New Regulations on Economic Responsibility Audit in 2019 as a natural experiment, this paper uses data from A-share listed companies from 2016 to 2021 to examine the impact of economic responsibility audit on SOEs’ cash holdings. The empirical results show that the level of cash holdings after the New Regulations is reduced by 16.07% on average compared to that before the New Regulations. Further analysis finds that economic responsibility audit reduces cash holdings by lowering agency costs and thus ultimately enhances corporate value. Cross-sectional examination shows that when the shareholding ratio of institutional investors is high, the quality of external auditing is high, and the motivation for management promotion is strong, the negative correlation between economic responsibility auditing and cash holdings in SOEs is more pronounced. This paper provides empirical evidence of the causal relationship between economic responsibility audit and SOEs’ cash holdings, which not only enriches the study of the economic consequences of economic responsibility audit, providing theoretical reference and practical guidance for deepening the reform of audit system, but also provides important implications for enhancing the governance capacity of SOEs and realizing the improvement of quality and efficiency of state-owned assets.

This paper makes the following contributions: First, it confirms the impact of economic responsibility audit on SOEs’ cash holdings, and reveals the micro-governance effect of economic responsibility audit in achieving the healthy development of enterprises and the preservation and appreciation of state-owned assets, expanding the research on corporate financial decision-making. Second, the exogenous impact of the New Regulations on Economic Responsibility Audit proves the importance of economic responsibility audit in optimizing the resource allocation of SOEs, providing empirical evidence for economic responsibility audit to promote the modernization of national governance system and governance capacity.

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