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2879控股股东利益侵占问题是中国证券市场的“顽疾”，近年来证监会采取了一系列监管措施，但仍然收效甚微。文章通过手工收集整理中证中小投资者服务中心行权数据，考察了投服中心行权对上市公司控股股东利益侵占行为的治理效应。研究发现，投服中心的行权有效抑制了上市公司控股股东的利益侵占行为；且这一作用是通过提高中小股东在利益侵占相关议案中的投票率、提高上市公司的媒体负面关注度和增加其面临的诉讼风险实现的。进一步分析发现，上述治理效应在内外部治理环境较差的上市公司中更为显著，且当投服中心采取公开发声和参加股东大会这两种方式行权时，对控股股东利益侵占行为的治理效果更显著。文章拓展了中小投资者保护的相关研究，为投服中心保护中小投资者提供了更加直接的证据，对保护中小投资者和投服中心未来开展工作具有重要借鉴意义。
投服中心行权与控股股东利益侵占——基于关联交易视角
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引用本文
甘月, 李增福. 投服中心行权与控股股东利益侵占——基于关联交易视角[J]. 财经研究, 2023, 49(11): 80-94.
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