2889 
2969党的十九届五中全会提出要“加强和改进反垄断和反不正当竞争执法”，而垄断协议是当前较常见的垄断形式，对其进行研究具有显著的学术价值。实践中，第三方举报与行业协会可能会强化反垄断执法的靶向性，从而影响垄断协议的形成、持续与消失。因此，文章在理论分析基础上，基于2008—2021年中国横向垄断协议案件卷宗的微观数据，运用生存分析法检验反垄断执法中第三方举报与行业协会对垄断协议稳定性的影响。结果表明，第三方举报和行业协会的参与显著降低了垄断协议的稳定性，是反垄断执法的有效途径。进一步的分析表明，只有直接举报可以显著降低垄断协议稳定性；行业协会作为组织者和协调者均会削弱垄断协议稳定性。同时，成员越多，垄断协议越可能需要行业协会的参与。文章的研究结论为针对横向垄断协议的反垄断执法提供了直接的经验证据，同时对深化行业协会改革具有参考意义。
第三方举报、行业协会与垄断协议稳定性——基于案件卷宗数据的分析
摘要
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引用本文
陈林, 张涛, 刘振鹏. 第三方举报、行业协会与垄断协议稳定性——基于案件卷宗数据的分析[J]. 财经研究, 2022, 48(6): 155-169.
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