1148 
1441我国最高人民法院于2022年1月发布《关于审理证券市场虚假陈述侵权民事赔偿案件的若干规定》（简称《规定》），取消了审理上市公司虚假陈述民事案件的行政前置程序。该事件具有两方面的理论检验价值：第一，前置程序取消可能增强市场主体识别潜在诉讼对象的动机，通过考察尚未受到任何行政处罚的潜在虚假陈述公司是否遭受了股票市场负面反应，可以检验前置条件的设置对民事诉讼震慑范围的影响，从而深化对公共执法与私人执法相互关系的理解；第二，给定新《证券法》已做出的一系列变革，可以检验前置程序取消这一单项司法变革相较于已有立法是否具有明显的增量效应。文章研究发现，未受到行政处罚、但虚假陈述倾向较高的公司在《规定》发布日附近发生了显著的股价负面反应，且在交易所异常业绩问询频率较高的公司中更加突出，而已满足行政前置条件的公司在《规定》发布日附近未发生显著的股价反应。文章研究表明，虚假陈述民事诉讼的前置程序取消显著扩大了民事诉讼的震慑范围，对于加强投资者保护、优化营商环境、培育高质量市场主体具有积极意义。
证券虚假陈述民事诉讼的前置程序取消与股票市场反应
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吴溪, 吴雨珊, 王彦超. 证券虚假陈述民事诉讼的前置程序取消与股票市场反应[J]. 财经研究, 2024, 50(3): 138-153.
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