金融契约、决策权配置与管理者激励
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财经研究 2007 年 第 33 卷第 06 期, 页码：134 - 144
摘要
参考文献
摘要
突破传统的现金流分析思路,从金融契约和决策权配置视角分析了管理者激励问题,认为外部投资者和经营者之间的决策权配置对经营者行动选择和投资者利益保护产生重要影响。模型分析结果表明,投资者和经营者之间的一般控制权分配并不必然与所有权相匹配,而是受到金融契约缔结过程中双方谈判力大小的影响,经营者最低让渡控制权大小受到投资者期望投资回报、市场监管环境和管理者团队声誉等五个因素影响。
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[21]刘磊,万迪?.企业中的核心控制权与一般控制权[J].中国工业经济,2004,(2):68~76.
引用本文
徐细雄, 万迪昉, 淦未宇. 金融契约、决策权配置与管理者激励[J]. 财经研究, 2007, 33(6): 134–144.
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