企业理论丛林中的新韦伯主义
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外国经济与管理 2005 年 第 27 卷第 05 期, 页码：10 - 15
摘要
参考文献
摘要
在企业“为何”存在和企业“如何”运行这两个问题上,现代企业理论提出了各种各样的假说,导致了当前的理论丛林状态。马克斯·韦伯的官僚科层思想为同时解释这两个问题提供了理论基础。新韦伯主义以决策规则为唯一的核心概念,赋予其唯一的定义,并在各派观点上提出了统一的假设,最终建立了基于决策规则的企业理论,是韦伯的科层效率思想在企业理论研究领域的进一步扩展。新韦伯主义企业理论只是结束现代企业理论丛林状态的一种尝试,有助于解释创新型企业的问题,但并不能包容企业理论所有的重要方面,特别是企业规模问题。
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李陈华. 企业理论丛林中的新韦伯主义[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2005, 27(5): 10–15.
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