多委托人代理关系——共同代理理论研究及其最新进展
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外国经济与管理 2004 年 第 26 卷第 10 期, 页码：10 - 14
摘要
参考文献
摘要
共同代理理论是对传统委托代理理论的深化和扩展 ,它将简单的单委托人—单代理人的双边委托代理框架扩展为多委托人—单代理人框架 ,使其对某些经济和社会现象更具解释力。尤其通过与排他性代理相比较 ,研究共同代理对竞争和社会福利的影响 ,对规制制度和反垄断法规的制定均具有一定的指导意义。本文梳理了共同代理理论产生和演进的脉络 ,并介绍了这一理论的应用和实证检验成果 ,最后指出了现有模型中有待进一步研究的问题以及该领域未来的发展方向。
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引用本文
王小芳, 管锡展. 多委托人代理关系——共同代理理论研究及其最新进展[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2004, 26(10): 10–14.
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