稳定配置与市场设计:合作博弈理论的扩展与应用——2012年度诺贝尔经济学奖得主夏普利和罗思主要经济理论贡献述评
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外国经济与管理 2012 年 第 34 卷第 11 期, 页码：1 - 10
摘要
参考文献
摘要
劳埃德·夏普利(Lloyd Shapley)和阿尔文·罗思(Alvin Roth)因对稳定配置理论和市场设计实践的卓越贡献而荣膺2012年度诺贝尔经济学奖。本文在概述合作博弈论基本分析框架的基础上,对夏普利为稳定配置理论及其算法研究做出的贡献,以及罗思对稳定配置理论的经验分析、实验研究及其在现实市场设计实践中的扩展和应用等方面所做出的贡献进行了系统述评,并且介绍了公平分配的夏普利值及其变体的含义和应用,最后指出了他俩的经济理论贡献对于处在经济社会转型关键时期的中国的重要理论启示意义和实践指导价值。
①读者如想更全面地了解合作博弈理论,可以参阅莫林著的《合作的微观经济学:一种博弈论的阐释》,格致出版社、上海三联出版社、上海人民出版社,2011。
⑦读者可以参考相关的网络报道,http://szbk.wnrb.net/html/2012-10/11/content_1542835.htm。
[1]Ashlagi I and Roth A E.New challenges in multi-hospital kidney exchange[J].American Economic Review,2012,102(2):354-359.
[2]Edelman B,et al.Internet advertising and the generalized second-price auction:Selling billions of dollars worth of key-words[J].American Economic Review,2007,97(2):242-259.
[3]Gale D and Shapley L S.College admissions and the stability of marriage[J].American Mathematical Monthly,1962,69(1):9-15.
[4]McKinney C N,et al.The collapse of a medical labor clearing-house(and why such failures are rare)[J].American Economic Review,2005,95(3):878-889.
[5]Roth A E.The economics of matching:Stability and incen-tives[J].Mathematics of Operations Research,1982,7(4):617-628.
[6]Roth,A E.The evolution of the labor market for medical in-terns and residents:A case study in game theory[J].Journal of Political Economy,1984a,92(6):991-1016.
[7]Roth A E.Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem[J].Journal of Economic Theory,1984b,34(2):383-387.
[8]Roth A E.A natural experiment in the organization of entry level labor markets:Regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the UK[J].American Economic Review,1991,81(3):415-40.
[9]Roth A E.Repugnance as a constraint on markets[J].Jour-nal of Economic Perspectives,2007,21(1):37-58.
[10]Roth A E.What have we learned from market design?[J].Economic Journal,2008,118(2):285-310.
[11]Roth A E and Xing X.Jumping the gun:Imperfections and institutions related to the timing of market transactions[J].American Economic Review,1994,84(4):992-1044.
[12]Roth A E and Rothblum U.Truncation strategies in mat-ching markets:In search of advice for participants[J].Econo-metrica,1999,67(1):21-43.
[13]Roth A E and Peranson E.The redesign of the matching market for American physicians:Some engineering aspects of economic design[J].American Economic Review,1999,89(4):748-779.
[14]Roth A E,et al.Kidney exchange[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2004,119(3):457-488.
[15]Roth A E and Sotomayor M.Two-sided matching:A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1990.
[16]Serrano R.Cooperative games:Core and Shapley value[A].Meyers R(Ed.).Encyclopedia of complexity and systems sci-ence[C].New York:Springer,2009.
[17]Shapley L S.A value for n-person games[A].Kuhn H W and Tucker A W(Eds.).Contributions to the theory of games(Vol.2)[C].Princeton,NJ:Princeton University Press,1953.
[18]Shapley L S.Markets as cooperative games[R].Rand Cor-poration Memorandum P-629,1955.
[19]Shapley L S.On balanced sets and cores[J].Navel Research Logistics Quarterly,1967,9(1):45-48.
[20]Shapley L S.Cores of convex games[J].International Jour-nal of Game Theory,1971,1(1):11-26.
[21]Shapley L S and Shubik M.A method of evaluating the distri-bution of power in a committee system[J].American Political Science Review,1954,48(1):787-792
[22]Shapley L S and Shubik M.The assignment game I:The core[J].International Journal of Game Theory,1971,1(1):111-130.
[23]Shapley L S and Scarf H.On cores and indivisibility[J].Journal of Mathematical Economics,1974,1(1):23-37.
[24]The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences.Stable allocations and the practice of market design[EB/OL].Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences,2012.
[25]The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences.Stable matching:The-ory,evidence,and practical design[EB/OL].Royal Swedish Acad-emy of Sciences,2012.
[26]董保民等.合作博弈论[M].北京:中国市场出版社,2008.
[27]郭其友,李宝良.冲突与合作:博弈理论的扩展与应用[J].外国经济与管理,2005,(11):1-11.
[28]郭其友,李宝良.机制设计理论:资源最优配置机制性质的解释与应用[J].外国经济与管理,2007,(11):1-8.
[29]何维.莫林著.合作的微观经济学——一种博弈论的阐释[M].(童乙伦,梁碧译).上海:格致出版社,上海三联出版社,上海人民出版社,2011.
[30]萨谬.鲍尔斯著.微观经济学:行为、制度与演化[M].(江艇等译).北京:中国人民大学出版社,2006.
[31]魏立佳.中国高考录取与博士生录取的机制设计[J].经济学(季刊),2009,(1):349-362.
⑦读者可以参考相关的网络报道,http://szbk.wnrb.net/html/2012-10/11/content_1542835.htm。
[1]Ashlagi I and Roth A E.New challenges in multi-hospital kidney exchange[J].American Economic Review,2012,102(2):354-359.
[2]Edelman B,et al.Internet advertising and the generalized second-price auction:Selling billions of dollars worth of key-words[J].American Economic Review,2007,97(2):242-259.
[3]Gale D and Shapley L S.College admissions and the stability of marriage[J].American Mathematical Monthly,1962,69(1):9-15.
[4]McKinney C N,et al.The collapse of a medical labor clearing-house(and why such failures are rare)[J].American Economic Review,2005,95(3):878-889.
[5]Roth A E.The economics of matching:Stability and incen-tives[J].Mathematics of Operations Research,1982,7(4):617-628.
[6]Roth,A E.The evolution of the labor market for medical in-terns and residents:A case study in game theory[J].Journal of Political Economy,1984a,92(6):991-1016.
[7]Roth A E.Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem[J].Journal of Economic Theory,1984b,34(2):383-387.
[8]Roth A E.A natural experiment in the organization of entry level labor markets:Regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the UK[J].American Economic Review,1991,81(3):415-40.
[9]Roth A E.Repugnance as a constraint on markets[J].Jour-nal of Economic Perspectives,2007,21(1):37-58.
[10]Roth A E.What have we learned from market design?[J].Economic Journal,2008,118(2):285-310.
[11]Roth A E and Xing X.Jumping the gun:Imperfections and institutions related to the timing of market transactions[J].American Economic Review,1994,84(4):992-1044.
[12]Roth A E and Rothblum U.Truncation strategies in mat-ching markets:In search of advice for participants[J].Econo-metrica,1999,67(1):21-43.
[13]Roth A E and Peranson E.The redesign of the matching market for American physicians:Some engineering aspects of economic design[J].American Economic Review,1999,89(4):748-779.
[14]Roth A E,et al.Kidney exchange[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2004,119(3):457-488.
[15]Roth A E and Sotomayor M.Two-sided matching:A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1990.
[16]Serrano R.Cooperative games:Core and Shapley value[A].Meyers R(Ed.).Encyclopedia of complexity and systems sci-ence[C].New York:Springer,2009.
[17]Shapley L S.A value for n-person games[A].Kuhn H W and Tucker A W(Eds.).Contributions to the theory of games(Vol.2)[C].Princeton,NJ:Princeton University Press,1953.
[18]Shapley L S.Markets as cooperative games[R].Rand Cor-poration Memorandum P-629,1955.
[19]Shapley L S.On balanced sets and cores[J].Navel Research Logistics Quarterly,1967,9(1):45-48.
[20]Shapley L S.Cores of convex games[J].International Jour-nal of Game Theory,1971,1(1):11-26.
[21]Shapley L S and Shubik M.A method of evaluating the distri-bution of power in a committee system[J].American Political Science Review,1954,48(1):787-792
[22]Shapley L S and Shubik M.The assignment game I:The core[J].International Journal of Game Theory,1971,1(1):111-130.
[23]Shapley L S and Scarf H.On cores and indivisibility[J].Journal of Mathematical Economics,1974,1(1):23-37.
[24]The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences.Stable allocations and the practice of market design[EB/OL].Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences,2012.
[25]The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences.Stable matching:The-ory,evidence,and practical design[EB/OL].Royal Swedish Acad-emy of Sciences,2012.
[26]董保民等.合作博弈论[M].北京:中国市场出版社,2008.
[27]郭其友,李宝良.冲突与合作:博弈理论的扩展与应用[J].外国经济与管理,2005,(11):1-11.
[28]郭其友,李宝良.机制设计理论:资源最优配置机制性质的解释与应用[J].外国经济与管理,2007,(11):1-8.
[29]何维.莫林著.合作的微观经济学——一种博弈论的阐释[M].(童乙伦,梁碧译).上海:格致出版社,上海三联出版社,上海人民出版社,2011.
[30]萨谬.鲍尔斯著.微观经济学:行为、制度与演化[M].(江艇等译).北京:中国人民大学出版社,2006.
[31]魏立佳.中国高考录取与博士生录取的机制设计[J].经济学(季刊),2009,(1):349-362.
引用本文
李宝良, 郭其友. 稳定配置与市场设计:合作博弈理论的扩展与应用——2012年度诺贝尔经济学奖得主夏普利和罗思主要经济理论贡献述评[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2012, 34(11): 1–10.
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