特许权价值和单体银行稳健性的关系研究
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财经研究 2010 年 第 36 卷第 12 期, 页码：64 - 73
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章在对国内外相关文献进行梳理的基础上,分析了特许权价值自律效应的形成机理,在此基础上以不良贷款率、贷款损失准备金率和净资产收益率作为衡量银行稳健性的被解释变量,以基于托宾Q值计算的各上市银行的特许权价值及资产规模、财务杠杆、资本杠杆等为解释变量,对中国上市银行以政府监管、隐性保险为虚拟变量,构建特许权价值和银行稳健性的计量经济模型,并采用中国14家上市银行2000-2009年的非平衡面板数据进行实证分析。研究发现,特许权价值越高,其自律作用越明显,银行的稳健性越好;隐性保险制度削弱了特许权价值对银行稳健经营的促进作用,并且隐性保险对我国商业银行的保护和其所有制形式无关;银行规模越大越不容易倒闭。因此,可以通过提高银行自身核心竞争力、引入显性保险制度和加强政府监管等措施提高银行特许权价值,以增强银行的稳健性。
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[2]韩立岩,李伟.外资银行进入与中国商业银行特许权价值[J].世界经济,2008,(10):22-32.
[3]李艳,张涤新.中国商业银行特许权价值:基于面板数据的实证研究[J].当代财经,2006,(3):40-45.
[4]李燕平,韩立岩.特许权价值、隐性保险与风险承担——中国银行业的经验分析[J].金融研究,2008,(1):76-87.
[5]陆前进.银行的特许权价值分析及政策含义[J].立信会计高等专科学校学报,2002,(3):16-33.
[6]马晓军,欧阳姝.中美两国商业银行特许权价值及影响因素的比较研究[J].金融研究,2007,(4):53-71.
[7]苑素静.韩国金融危机中银行特许权价值降低的实证分析[J].现代财经,2005,(12):33-37.
[8]张正平,何广文.隐性保险、市场约束与我国银行业改革[J].中国软科学,2005,(12):38-43.
[9]Demsetz R,MR Saidenberg,P E Strahan.Banks with something tolose:The discipli-nary role of franchise value[J].Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review,1996,(10):1-14.
[10]Diamond,Rajan.Present models that formalize a bank’s franchise value andits liquid-ity and fragilityimplications[J].Journal of Economics and Business,1968,(76):542-593.
[11]Fisher K P,Gueyie J P.Charter value and commercial banks’risk-takinginthe NAF-TAcountries[J].The International Journal of Finance,2001,(13):2027-2044.
[12]Furlong F,S Kwan.Sources of bank charter value[R].Working Paper,Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,2006.
[13]Keeley M C.Deposit insurance,risk,and market power in banking[J].American Economic Review,1990,80(5):1183-1200.
[14]Kentaro Iwatsubo.Bank capital shocks and portfolio risk:Evidence from Japan[J].Japan and the World Economy,2007,(19):166-186.
[15]Marcus A J.Deregulation and bank financial policy[J].Journal of Banking andFinance,1984,(8):557-565.
[16]Olivier De Jonghe,Rudi Vander Vennet.Competition versus efficiency:What drives franchise values in European banking-[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2008,(32):1820-1835.
[17]Park S.Risk-taking behavior of banks under regulation[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,1997,(2):491-507.
[18]Rafael Repullo.Capital requirements,market power and risk-taking in a dynamic model of bank behaviour[R].CEPR Discussion Papers,2002.
[19]Saunders A,Wilson B.Bank capital structure:An analysis of the charter value hypothesis[R].Working Paper,New-York University,1994.
引用本文
曲洪建, 孙明贵. 特许权价值和单体银行稳健性的关系研究[J]. 财经研究, 2010, 36(12): 64–73.
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