竞争、捆绑与规制——以电信业“全业务竞争”为视角
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财经研究 2010 年 第 36 卷第 07 期, 页码：29 - 39
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摘要
文章考察了在电信业"全业务竞争"的背景下,规制机构采取限制强势厂商实施捆绑策略这种非对称规制措施的效果。结果发现,当宽带(固话)市场为垄断结构时,不仅能够扶持弱势厂商,而且消费者剩余与社会福利都增加;当宽带(固话)市场为双寡头竞争时,虽然能够扶持弱势厂商,并且提高社会福利,但是消费者剩余下降,并且在短期内,弱势厂商在移动通信市场的份额甚至会下降。
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[2] Armstrong M,Vickers J. Competitive price discrimination[J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 2001,32:579--605．
[3] Armstrong M, Vickers J. Competitive nonlinear pricing and bundling[EB/OL]. Working Paper, 2008, http://else. econ. ucl. ac. uk/papers/uploaded/220． pdf.
[4] Gans J, King S. Paying for loyalty: Product bundling in oligopoly[J]. Journal of Industrial Economics, 2006, 54 : 43-62．
[5] Nalebuff B. Bundling as an entry barrier[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2004, 119:159--188．
[6] Thanassoulis J. Competitive mixed bundling and consumer surplus[J]. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2007,16 : 437--467．
[7] Whinston M. Tying, foreclosure and exclusion[J]. American Economic Review, 1990, 80 : 837--859．
引用本文
陈剑, 夏大慰, 时奇. 竞争、捆绑与规制——以电信业“全业务竞争”为视角[J]. 财经研究, 2010, 36(7): 29–39.
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