政策性扰动、大股东制衡与董事会独立性
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财经研究 2010 年 第 36 卷第 05 期, 页码：28 - 40
摘要
参考文献
摘要
注意到伴随《指导意见》和股权分置改革而来的政策性扰动对大股东制衡行为的影响,文章选择2000-2008年中国市场的经验证据,从第二类代理问题出发,细致刻画上市公司前五大股东间的制衡行为,并讨论前两大股东的勾结行为,研究大股东制衡机制对董事会独立性的重要作用。
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[2]唐跃军.大股东制衡机制:基于中国市场的实证与实验研究[M].南昌:江西人民出版社,2008.
[3]唐跃军,李维安,谢仍明.大股东制衡、信息不对称与外部审计约束[J].审计研究,2006,(5):33-39.
[4]唐跃军,吕斐适,程新生.大股东制衡、治理战略与信息披露[J].经济学(季刊),2008,7(2):647-664.
[5]唐跃军,谢仍明.大股东制衡机制与现金股利的隧道效应[J].南开经济研究,2006,(1):60-78.
[6]吴晓晖,姜彦福.机构投资者影响下独立董事治理效率变化研究[J].中国工业经济,2006,(5):105-111.
[7]Arthur N.Board composition as the outcome of aninternational bargaining process:Em-pirical evidence[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2001,7(3):307-340.
[8]Bennedsen M,D Wolfenzon.The balance of power in closely held corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58(1/2):113-139.
[9]Brickley J,C James.The takeover market,corporate board composition,and ownershipstructure:The case of banking[J].The Journal of Lawand Economics,1987,30(1):161-181.
[10]Cronqvist H,M Nilsson.Agency costs of controlling minority shareholders[J].Journalof Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2003,38(4):695-719.
[11]Denis D,A Sarin.Ownership and board structures in publicly traded corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1999,52(2):187-224.
[12]Fan Joseph P H,Jian Ming,Yeh Yin Hua.Succession:The roles of specialized assetsand transfer costs[R].Working Paper,http://ssrn.com/abstract=1101405,2008.
[13]Gomes A,W Novaes.Sharing of control as a corporate governance mechanism[R].PIER Working Paper 01 029,University of Pennsylvania,2001.
[14]La Porta R,Lopez-de-Silance F,Shleifer A,et al.Lawand finance[J].Journal of Politi-cal Economy,1998,106(6):1113-1155.
[15]La Porta R,Lopez-de-Silance F,Shleifer A,et al.Agency problems and dividend poli-cies around the world[J].Journal of Finance,2008,55(1):1-33.
[16]La Porta R,Lopez-de-Silanes F,AShleifer.Corporate ownership around the world[J].Journal of Finance,1999,54(2):471-517.
[17]Mark Y T,Y Li.Determinations of corporate ownership and board structure:Evidencefrom Singapore[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2001,7(3):235-256.
[18]Maury B,A Pajuste.Multiple large shareholders and firmvalue[J].Journal of Bankingand Finance,2005,29(7):1813-1834.
[19]Pagano M,A Roel.The choice of stock ownership structure:Agency costs,monitoringand the decisionto go public[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998,(1):187-226.
[20]Randφy T,J I Jenssen.Boardindependence and product market competitionin Swedishfirms[J].Corporate Governance:An International Review,2004,12(3):281-289.
[21]Rediker KJ,A Seth.Boards of directors and substitution effects of alternative govern-ance mechanisms[J].Strategic Management Journal,1995,16(2):85-99.
[22]Shleifer A,R WVishny.Large shareholders and corporate control[J].Journal of Politi-cal Economy,1986,94(3):461-488.
[23]Weisbach M.Outside directors and CEOturnover[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20(January-March):431-460.
[24]Yermack D.Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1996,40(2):185-212.
引用本文
唐跃军, 左晶晶. 政策性扰动、大股东制衡与董事会独立性[J]. 财经研究, 2010, 36(5): 28–40.
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