声誉、政治关系与企业垂直整合
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财经研究 2011 年 第 37 卷第 12 期, 页码：29 - 40
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章针对我国经济转轨的实际,利用上市公司数据,实证考察了声誉和政治关系对企业垂直整合的影响。研究发现,由于较易与利益相关者订立合约,声誉良好企业垂直整合的程度较低;相反,政治关联企业更有动机和能力通过涉足上下游产业来攫取垄断利润,从而垂直整合的程度较高。基于制度环境的分析显示,声誉和政治关系对企业垂直整合的影响在弱制度环境下更为明显。此外,公司所有权也影响了声誉、政治关系与垂直整合间的关系。声誉良好的民营企业表现出更低的垂直整合度,而有政治关联的国有企业进入上下游产业的动机更强。
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[3]罗党论,甄丽明.民营控制、政治关系与企业融资约束——基于中国民营上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,2008,(12):164-178.
[4]Acemoglu D,Johnson S,Mitton T.Determinants of vertical integration:Financial de-velopment and contracting costs[J].Journal of Finance,2009,63:1251-1290.
[5]Coase R.The nature of the firm[J].Economica,1937,(4):386-405.
[6]Faccio M,Masulis R,McConnell J.Political connections and corporate bailouts[J].Journal of Finance,2006,61:2597-2635.
[7]Fan P,Huang J,Morck R,et al.Vertical integration,institutional determinants andimpact:Evidence from China[R].NBER Working Paper,2009.
[8]Fan P,Wong T,Zhang T.Politically-connected CEOs,corporate governance and post-IPO performance of China’s partially privatized firms[J].Journal of Financial Eco-nomics,2007,84:330-357.
[9]Fisman R.Estimating the value of political connections[J].American Economic Re-view,2001,91:1095-1102.
[10]Greif A.Reputation and coalitions in medieval trade:Evidence on the Maghribi tra-ders[J].Journal of Economic History,1989,49:857-882.
[11]Grossman S,Hart O.The costs and benefits of ownership:A theory of vertical andlateral integration[J].Journal of Political Economy,1986,94,691-719.
[12]Hayek F.Individualism and economic order[M].Chicago:University of ChicagoPress,1948.
[13]Khanna T,Palepu K.Why focused strategies may be wrong for emerging markets[J].Harvard Business Review,1997,75:41-51.
[14]Khwaja A,Mian A.Tracing the impact of bank liquidity shocks:Evidence from anemerging market[J].American Economic Review,2008,98:1413-1442.
[15]Klein B,Crawford R,Alchian A.Vertical integration,appropriable rents,and thecompetitive contracting process[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1978,21:297-326.
[16]Klein B,Leffler K.The role of market forces in assuring contractual performance[J].Journal of Political Economy,1981,89:615-641.
[17]Marshall A.Principles of economics:An introduction volume[M].New York:Mac-millan,1949.
[18]Williamson O.Transaction-cost economies:The governance of contractual rela-tions[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1979,22:233-261.
[19]Xin K,Pearce J.Guanxi:Connections as substitutes for formal institutional support[J].Academy of Management Journal,1996,39:1641-1658.
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张天舒, 黄俊. 声誉、政治关系与企业垂直整合[J]. 财经研究, 2011, 37(12): 29–40.
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