“从业权取缔”型审计监管的警示效应
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财经研究 2012 年 第 38 卷第 07 期, 页码：102 - 111
摘要
参考文献
摘要
市场危机通常会引发标志性的监管,所谓乱世用重典。文章关注于中国审计市场标志性的"从业权取缔"型监管事件,在为该事件构建了从"舞弊警示"到"基于财务风险的市场溢酬和审计费用敏感度提升"的分析框架后,文章的检验提供了关键性的经验证据:其一,较之普通公司,财务风险高的公司表现出明显的市场溢酬;其二,警示性的市场溢酬越高,后续的审计费用对财务风险的敏感度越强。综合结果表明,实现行业协会和外部监管部门对从业权的共治,并决定其是否取缔的模式,能够通过惩罚机会主义行为影响投资者的信念和从业者的执业格局,这为新兴审计市场监管的积极意义提供了证据。
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②矩阵公式为(A′A)-1A′=(WONE/WABS)
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[3]李长爱.政府行政监管与行业自律监管的协调发展———提高我国注册会计师行业监管效率研究[J].审计研究,2004,(6):71-75.
[4]刘明辉,徐正刚.注册会计师行业管理模式的现实选择———兼论行业自律[J].审计研究,2004,(1):52-56.
[5]刘永泽,陈艳.政府监管与行业自律导向的现实选择———对美国注册会计师行业监管模式的剖析引发的思考[J].会计研究,2002,(11):28-31.
[6]王跃堂,陈世敏.脱钩改制对审计独立性影响的实证研究[J].审计研究,2001,(3):2-9.
[7]王跃堂,涂建明.上市公司审计委员会治理有效性的实证研究———来自沪深两市的经验证据[J].管理世界,2006,(11):135-143.
[8]田野,陈全.审计师变更的经济后果研究———来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].中国会计评论,2011,(3):317-336.
[9]Baber W R,Kumar K R,Verghese T.Client security price reactions to the Laventholand Horwath bankruptcy[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1995,33(2):385-395.
[10]Chen J P,Chen S,Su X.Profitability regulation,earnings management and modified au-dit opinions:Evidence from China[J].Auditing:A Journal of Practice and Theory,2001a,20(2):9-30.
[11]Chen J P,Chen S,Su X.Is accounting information value-relevant in the emerging Chi-nese stock market?[J].Journal of International Accounting,Auditing,and Taxation,2001b,(10):1-22.
[12]Karafiath I.Using dummy variables in the event methodology[J].The Financial Re-view,1988,23(3):351-357.
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[14]Menon K,Williams D D.The insurance hypothesis and market prices[J].The Account-ing Review,1994,69(2):327-342.
[15]Nelson K K,Price R A,Rountree B R.The market reaction to Arthur Andersen’s rolein the Enron scandal:Loss of reputation or confounding effects?[J].Journal ofAccounting&Economics,2008,46(2):279-293.
[16]Pistor K,Xu C.Governing stock markets in transition economics:Lessons from..China[J].American Law&Economics Review,2005,7(1):184-210.
[17]Sefcik S E,Thompson R.An approach to statistical inference in cross-sectional modelswith security abnormal returns as dependent variable[J].Journal of Accounting Re-search,1986,24(2):316-334.
[18]Venkataraman R,Weber J P,Willenborg M.Litigation risk,audit quality,and auditfees:Evidence from Initial Public Offerings[J].The Accounting Review,2008,83(5):1315-1345.
[19]Zhang I X.Economic consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002[J].Journal ofAccounting&Economics,2007,44:74-115.
①详见财会[2002]1031号文件。
②矩阵公式为(A′A)-1A′=(WONE/WABS)
引用本文
赵子夜. “从业权取缔”型审计监管的警示效应[J]. 财经研究, 2012, 38(7): 102–111.
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