遗产税、民生财政与中国经济结构转型
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财经研究 2015 年 第 41 卷第 01 期, 页码：4 - 20
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章运用拓展的迭代模型分析了征收遗产税用于社会保险、教育等民生领域对宏观经济、产业结构和社会福利的影响。研究表明:(1)当遗产税补贴积累型社会保险时为完全中性。(2)在补贴现收现付制社会保险和教育时会减少储蓄、提高老年消费、降低代际财富转移;如果补贴教育或和收入关联的现收现付制,还将推动教育的上升并且前者的影响更大。(3)遗产税收入具有"拉弗曲线特征"。(4)实证检验除证实上述结论外还表明相对于补贴现收现付制,在遗产税收入补贴教育时更有利于实现"稳增长、调结构、促消费"这三个重要的宏观经济管理目标,并大大减少社会福利损失。在存在计划生育时,经济增长率更高,社会福利损失将更小;在生育率内生时,遗产税将推动生育率恢复,但对劳动力供给的影响存在不确定性。
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[4]高萍.关于遗产税的研究[J].税务研究,2004,(2):48-51.
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[6]郭月梅,杨慧芳.文化视角下我国开征遗产税的困境与突破[J].财政研究,2011,(11):51-54.
[7]李稻葵,徐欣,江红平.中国经济国民投资率的福利经济学分析[J].经济研究,2012,(9):46-56.
[8]李玲.中国教育投资对经济增长低贡献水平的成因分析[J].财经研究,2004,(8):40-51.
[9]刘佐.关于目前中国开征遗产税问题的一些不同看法[J].财贸经济,2003,(10):74-77.
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[11]沈坤荣,孙文杰.投资效率、资本形成与宏观经济波动——基于金融发展视角的实证研究[J].中国社会科学,2004,(6):52-63.
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[15]杨海燕.现代遗产税和赠与税理论研究综述[J].经济学动态,2004,(2):69-72.
[16]杨汝岱,陈斌开.高等教育改革、预防性储蓄与居民消费行为[J].经济研究,2009,(8):113-124.
[17]禹奎.中国遗产税研究:效应分析和政策选择[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2009.
[18]袁志刚,宋铮.人口年龄结构、养老保险制度与最优储蓄率[J].经济研究,2000,(11):24-32.
[19]Bai C,Hsieh C,Qian Y.The return to capital in China[J].Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,2006,37(2):61-102.
[20]Barro R.Are government bonds net wealth?[J].Journal of Political Economy,1974,82(6):1095-1117.
[21]Bossman M,Kleiber C,Wlde K.Bequests,taxation and the distribution of wealth in a general equilibrium model[J].Journal of Public Economics,2007,91(7-8):1247-1271.
[22]Bernheim D.Does the estate tax raise revenue?[A].Summers L.Tax policy and the economy[C].Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,1987.
[23]Bernheim D,Shleifer A,Summers L H.The strategic bequest motive[J].Journal of Political Economy,1985,93(6):1045-1076.
[24]CaballeJ.Endogenous growth,human capital,and bequests in a life-cycle model[J].Oxford Economic Papers,1995,47(1):156-181.
[25]Cox D.Motives for private income transfer[J].Journal of Political Economy,1987,95(3):508-546
[26]Cremer H,Pestieau P.Bequests,filial attention and fertility[J].Economica,1991,58(231):359-375
[27]Cremer H,Pestieau P.Wealth transfer taxation:A survey[R].DELTA Working Paper No.2003-20,2003.
[28]Diamond P A.National debt in a neoclassical growth model[J].American Economic Review,1965,55(5):1126-1150.
[29]Diamond P A,Orszag P R.Saving social security:A balanced approach[M].Washington,D.C.:Brookings Institution Press,2005.
[30]Futagami R,Kamada K,Sato T.Bequest motives and fertility decisions[J].Economics Letters,2006,92(3):348-352
[31]Gale W,Perozek M.Do Estate Taxes Reduce Savings?[M].Washington,D.C.:Brookings Institution Press,2001.
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[33]Horioka C Y.Do bequests increase or decrease wealth inequalities?[J].Economics Letters,2009,103(1):23-25.
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[35]Kennickell A,Lusardi A.Disentangling the importance of the precautionary saving mode[R].NBER Working Paper No.10888,2004.
[36]Kuijs L.Investment and saving in China[R].World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.3633,2005.
[37]Kotlikoff L,Summers L.The role of intergenerational transfers in aggregate capital accumulation[J].Journal of Political Economy,1981,89(4):706-732.
[38]Joulfaian D.Taxing wealth transfer and its behavioral consequence[J].National Tax Journal,2000,53(4):933-958.
[39]Joulfaian D.Choosing between gifts and bequests:How taxes affect the timing of wealth transfers[J].Journal of Public Economics,2005,89(11-12):2069-2091.
[40]McGarry K.Behavioral responses to the estate tax:Inter vivos giving[J].National Tax Journal,2001,53(4):913-932.
[41]Mirer T.The wealth-age relation among the aged[J].American Economic Review,1979,69(3):435-443.
[42]Modigliani F,Cao S L.The Chinese saving puzzle and the life-cycle hypothesis[J].Journal of Economic Literature,2004,42(1):145-170
[43]Page B R.Bequest taxes,inter vivos gifts,and the bequest motive[J].Journal of Public Economics,2003,87(5-6):1219-1229.
[44]Poterba J.Estate and gift taxes and incentives for inter vivos giving in the US[J].Journal of Public Economics,2001,79(1):237-264.
[45]Razin A,Sadka E.Population Economics[M].Cambridge MA:The MIT press,2003.
[46]Samuelson P.Optimum social security in a life-cycle growth model[J].International Economic Review,1975,16(3):539-544.
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[49]Shi Y,Zhang J.On high fertility rates in developing countries:Birth limits,birth taxes,or education subsidies?[J].Journal of Population Economics,2009,22(3):603-640.
[50]Zhang J.Optimal debt,endogenous fertility,and human capital externalities in a model with altruistic bequests[J].Journal of Public Economics,2003,87(7-8):1825-1835.
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遗产赠与税属于财产税,以遗产税为主税,赠与税为辅税,所以以下简称遗产税。
1本文的研究重点虽然仅放在了遗产税问题上,但如果不考虑模型中的工作和退休两期迭代结构,本文的研究模型和大部分结论同样适用于更广泛的财产税问题。
1表面上看,我们仅指定了三种遗产税的使用渠道,但是实际上分别代表了补贴给老年人、青年人和未成年人三种情况,已经概括了大多数民生财政领域。譬如,由于老年人医疗开支远大于青年人,所以遗产税用于补贴医疗开支也就类似于补贴现收现付的社会保险体系;由于通常青年人对住房需求更高,所以用于补贴住房保障也就类似于补贴积累制的社会保险体系;如果遗产税用于未成年人福利等,也就类似于补贴家庭教育投资。
2在本文正文中略去了一阶条件,参见附录。
1R1b的右上标1表示情形1补贴教育,下文补贴现收现付制时各变量右上标为2,以便于不同情形比较。
1本文迭代模型预设的代际时间跨度为25年,因此年折现率为0.035时,β≈0.4,如表1所示。
1以下公式中单下划线表示情形1即补贴教育时特有,双下划线表示情形2补贴现收现付制和社会保险体系时特有。
[2]迟巍,钱晓烨,吴斌珍.我国城镇居民家庭教育负担研究[J].清华大学教育研究,2012,(3):75-82.
[3]董丽霞,赵文哲.人口结构与储蓄率:基于内生人口结构的研究[J].金融研究,2011,(3):1-14.
[4]高萍.关于遗产税的研究[J].税务研究,2004,(2):48-51.
[5]顾六宝,肖红叶.基于消费者跨期选择的中国最优消费路径分析[J].统计研究,2005,(11):39-43.
[6]郭月梅,杨慧芳.文化视角下我国开征遗产税的困境与突破[J].财政研究,2011,(11):51-54.
[7]李稻葵,徐欣,江红平.中国经济国民投资率的福利经济学分析[J].经济研究,2012,(9):46-56.
[8]李玲.中国教育投资对经济增长低贡献水平的成因分析[J].财经研究,2004,(8):40-51.
[9]刘佐.关于目前中国开征遗产税问题的一些不同看法[J].财贸经济,2003,(10):74-77.
[10]龙志和,周浩明.中国城镇居民预防性储蓄实证研究[J].经济研究,2000,(11):33-38.
[11]沈坤荣,孙文杰.投资效率、资本形成与宏观经济波动——基于金融发展视角的实证研究[J].中国社会科学,2004,(6):52-63.
[12]汪伟.经济增长、人口结构变化与中国高储蓄[J].经济学(季刊),2010,(1):29-52.
[13]王弟海,龚六堂.增长经济中的消费和储蓄——兼论中国高储蓄率的原因[J].金融研究,2007,(12):1-16.
[14]徐忠,张雪春,丁志杰,等.公共财政与中国国民收入的高储蓄倾向[J].中国社会科学,2010,(6):93-107.
[15]杨海燕.现代遗产税和赠与税理论研究综述[J].经济学动态,2004,(2):69-72.
[16]杨汝岱,陈斌开.高等教育改革、预防性储蓄与居民消费行为[J].经济研究,2009,(8):113-124.
[17]禹奎.中国遗产税研究:效应分析和政策选择[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2009.
[18]袁志刚,宋铮.人口年龄结构、养老保险制度与最优储蓄率[J].经济研究,2000,(11):24-32.
[19]Bai C,Hsieh C,Qian Y.The return to capital in China[J].Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,2006,37(2):61-102.
[20]Barro R.Are government bonds net wealth?[J].Journal of Political Economy,1974,82(6):1095-1117.
[21]Bossman M,Kleiber C,Wlde K.Bequests,taxation and the distribution of wealth in a general equilibrium model[J].Journal of Public Economics,2007,91(7-8):1247-1271.
[22]Bernheim D.Does the estate tax raise revenue?[A].Summers L.Tax policy and the economy[C].Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,1987.
[23]Bernheim D,Shleifer A,Summers L H.The strategic bequest motive[J].Journal of Political Economy,1985,93(6):1045-1076.
[24]CaballeJ.Endogenous growth,human capital,and bequests in a life-cycle model[J].Oxford Economic Papers,1995,47(1):156-181.
[25]Cox D.Motives for private income transfer[J].Journal of Political Economy,1987,95(3):508-546
[26]Cremer H,Pestieau P.Bequests,filial attention and fertility[J].Economica,1991,58(231):359-375
[27]Cremer H,Pestieau P.Wealth transfer taxation:A survey[R].DELTA Working Paper No.2003-20,2003.
[28]Diamond P A.National debt in a neoclassical growth model[J].American Economic Review,1965,55(5):1126-1150.
[29]Diamond P A,Orszag P R.Saving social security:A balanced approach[M].Washington,D.C.:Brookings Institution Press,2005.
[30]Futagami R,Kamada K,Sato T.Bequest motives and fertility decisions[J].Economics Letters,2006,92(3):348-352
[31]Gale W,Perozek M.Do Estate Taxes Reduce Savings?[M].Washington,D.C.:Brookings Institution Press,2001.
[32]Gokhale J,Kotlikoff L,Sefton J,et al.Simulating the transmission of wealth inequality via bequests[J].Journal of Public Economics,2001,79(1):93-128.
[33]Horioka C Y.Do bequests increase or decrease wealth inequalities?[J].Economics Letters,2009,103(1):23-25.
[34]Heckman J.China’s investment in human capital[J].Economic Development and Cultural Change,2003,51(4):795-804.
[35]Kennickell A,Lusardi A.Disentangling the importance of the precautionary saving mode[R].NBER Working Paper No.10888,2004.
[36]Kuijs L.Investment and saving in China[R].World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.3633,2005.
[37]Kotlikoff L,Summers L.The role of intergenerational transfers in aggregate capital accumulation[J].Journal of Political Economy,1981,89(4):706-732.
[38]Joulfaian D.Taxing wealth transfer and its behavioral consequence[J].National Tax Journal,2000,53(4):933-958.
[39]Joulfaian D.Choosing between gifts and bequests:How taxes affect the timing of wealth transfers[J].Journal of Public Economics,2005,89(11-12):2069-2091.
[40]McGarry K.Behavioral responses to the estate tax:Inter vivos giving[J].National Tax Journal,2001,53(4):913-932.
[41]Mirer T.The wealth-age relation among the aged[J].American Economic Review,1979,69(3):435-443.
[42]Modigliani F,Cao S L.The Chinese saving puzzle and the life-cycle hypothesis[J].Journal of Economic Literature,2004,42(1):145-170
[43]Page B R.Bequest taxes,inter vivos gifts,and the bequest motive[J].Journal of Public Economics,2003,87(5-6):1219-1229.
[44]Poterba J.Estate and gift taxes and incentives for inter vivos giving in the US[J].Journal of Public Economics,2001,79(1):237-264.
[45]Razin A,Sadka E.Population Economics[M].Cambridge MA:The MIT press,2003.
[46]Samuelson P.Optimum social security in a life-cycle growth model[J].International Economic Review,1975,16(3):539-544.
[47]Shoven J B,Wise D A.The taxation of pensions:A shelter can become a trap[R].NBER Working Paper No.5815,1996.
[48]Stiglitz J.Notes on estate taxes,redistribution and the concept of balanced growth path incidence[J].Journal of Political Economy,1978,86(2):137-150.
[49]Shi Y,Zhang J.On high fertility rates in developing countries:Birth limits,birth taxes,or education subsidies?[J].Journal of Population Economics,2009,22(3):603-640.
[50]Zhang J.Optimal debt,endogenous fertility,and human capital externalities in a model with altruistic bequests[J].Journal of Public Economics,2003,87(7-8):1825-1835.
[51]Zhang J.Social security and endogenous growth[J].Journal of Public Economics,1995,58(2):185-213
[52]Zhang J,Zhang J.Bequest motives,social security,and economic growth[J].Economic Inquiry,2001,39(3):453-466.
遗产赠与税属于财产税,以遗产税为主税,赠与税为辅税,所以以下简称遗产税。
1本文的研究重点虽然仅放在了遗产税问题上,但如果不考虑模型中的工作和退休两期迭代结构,本文的研究模型和大部分结论同样适用于更广泛的财产税问题。
1表面上看,我们仅指定了三种遗产税的使用渠道,但是实际上分别代表了补贴给老年人、青年人和未成年人三种情况,已经概括了大多数民生财政领域。譬如,由于老年人医疗开支远大于青年人,所以遗产税用于补贴医疗开支也就类似于补贴现收现付的社会保险体系;由于通常青年人对住房需求更高,所以用于补贴住房保障也就类似于补贴积累制的社会保险体系;如果遗产税用于未成年人福利等,也就类似于补贴家庭教育投资。
2在本文正文中略去了一阶条件,参见附录。
1R1b的右上标1表示情形1补贴教育,下文补贴现收现付制时各变量右上标为2,以便于不同情形比较。
1本文迭代模型预设的代际时间跨度为25年,因此年折现率为0.035时,β≈0.4,如表1所示。
1以下公式中单下划线表示情形1即补贴教育时特有,双下划线表示情形2补贴现收现付制和社会保险体系时特有。
引用本文
张熠, 卞世博. 遗产税、民生财政与中国经济结构转型[J]. 财经研究, 2015, 41(1): 4–20.
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