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5940本文通过构建三维交互模型,探求了家族涉入程度与企业技术创新投入之间的关系,并递进研究治理情境复杂性的二维交互作用与绩效困境的三维交互作用。研究发现:随着家族涉入程度的上升,家族企业技术创新强度降低;当治理主体复杂程度上升时,家族涉入对企业技术创新投入的负向影响加深;而随着企业经营困境的加深,治理主体复杂性所致的负向调节作用进一步加深。上述结论与行为代理理论的预期相悖,说明治理情境复杂度可能是行为代理理论的适用边界之一,该理论不宜用于解释治理情境复杂企业的风险承担问题。
家族涉入与企业技术创新
摘要
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引用本文
闵亦杰, 陈志军, 李荣. 家族涉入与企业技术创新[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2016, 38(3): 86–98.
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