, 2
6063 
7394关系型交易会影响分析师的信息传递效率，进而对企业的信息环境产生影响。文章基于腐败官员落马这一准自然实验对上述假说进行了检验。文章以2005−2011年与24位省部级以上落马高官有关联的企业为样本，研究了政商关系的外生变化对分析师行为和企业信息环境的影响。文章基于双重差分模型，发现腐败官员落马后，与之关联企业的分析师预测准确性提高，预测分歧度降低，分析师跟踪数量增加，企业股价同步性降低。进一步检验发现，在官员落马影响关联企业股价同步性的过程中，分析师发挥了中介作用。可见，反腐能够降低分析师获取信息的门槛，提高分析师传递信息的效率，进而改善企业信息环境。
政商关系、分析师预测与股价同步性——基于腐败官员落马的准自然实验
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引用本文
官峰, 王俊杰, 章贵桥. 政商关系、分析师预测与股价同步性——基于腐败官员落马的准自然实验[J]. 财经研究, 2018, 44(7): 114-125.
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