7325 
5017中国式环境联邦主义内嵌于中国式分权体系，是对经典环境联邦主义理论的有益补充和完善。为了回答环境保护事务的集权与分权之争，文章着眼于碳减排事务，在考虑分权指标潜在内生性问题的基础上，构建静态、动态和动态空间面板数据模型实证检验了环境分权的碳排放效应。研究发现，环境分权对碳排放水平具有显著的正向影响，这意味着中国当前的环境分权体制不利于碳排放治理，为环境"垂直管理"体制提供了证据。文章进一步从中国环境管理体制的变迁历程、地方政府环保支出的激励不足与地方环保部门的独立性缺失三个方面，阐释了环境分权体制下碳减排困境的内在逻辑。为了构建碳排放长效治理的环境管理体制，中国式环境联邦主义应更多地体现集权的意志，优化"条块交叉"的属地管理体制，并形成"条条为主"的垂直管理与激励相容制度。
中国式环境联邦主义:环境分权对碳排放的影响研究
摘要
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引用本文
张华, 丰超, 刘贯春. 中国式环境联邦主义:环境分权对碳排放的影响研究[J]. 财经研究, 2017, 43(9): 33–49.
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