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4446本文从年报可读性视角，探究交易所问询函对董事联结公司年报可读性的治理作用。研究发现，财务报告问询函能够发挥显著的监管效果，不仅提高收函公司（发讯公司）年报可读性，而且促使与收函公司具有董事联结关系的上市公司（受讯公司）改善年报披露行为。尤其是当投资者关注度高、媒体报道多和产品市场竞争激烈的公司被问询时，受讯公司会更大幅度提高年报可读性。作用机理检验证实，财务报告问询函降低收函公司盈余管理、增加违规成本，对收函公司年报可读性产生直接影响；同时，基于联结董事对信息的传递并出于对其声誉的维护，问询函对受讯公司年报可读性产生间接影响。本文将问询函影响的范围从收函公司本身拓展至具有董事联结的公司，探讨交易所问询监管能否发挥间接治理效果，为完善证券市场监管模式、提高市场监管效率提供了新的思路。
财务问询函能够提高年报可读性吗？——来自董事联结上市公司的经验证据
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引用本文
翟淑萍, 王敏, 白梦诗. 财务问询函能够提高年报可读性吗？——来自董事联结上市公司的经验证据[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2020, 42(9): 136-152.
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