审计委员会“污点”董事与企业财务报告质量
“Tainted” Directors in Audit Committees and Corporate Financial Reporting Quality: Based on the Tenure of Directors Involving Administrative Penalties
DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20260409.203
[1]王美香,李维安,张耀伟,周宁.审计委员会“污点”董事与企业财务报告质量[J/OL].外国经济与管理,2026,48(11):3-20[2026-11-19].https://doi.org/10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20260409.203.
摘要
董事质量是影响审计委员会治理效能的关键因素。本研究聚焦具有行政处罚记录的“污点”董事,以2012—2023年沪深A股上市公司为样本,实证检验审计委员会成员任职资格缺陷对企业财务报告质量的影响。研究发现,当审计委员会存在“污点”董事时,企业财务报告质量显著下降。机制检验表明,内部监督机制失效加剧代理问题、外部治理压力增加扭曲管理层应对策略是审计委员会“污点”董事影响企业财务报告质量的重要路径。异质性分析显示,在内部人控制力较强、机构投资者持股比例较低、内部控制质量较差以及外部法治环境较弱的企业中,审计委员会存在“污点”董事对企业财务报告质量的损害更严重。基于审计委员会“污点”董事特征展开的拓展研究发现,“污点”董事权力渗透度越高、“污点”董事曾因直接损害财务报告质量被处罚、“污点”董事任独立董事或主任/召集人,企业财务报告质量越差,而强监管政策的实施则能够有效抑制审计委员会“污点”董事对财务报告质量的负面影响。在新《公司法》背景下,本研究为完善我国审计委员会成员任职资格等相关制度提供了理论依据和政策启示。
Director quality is a critical determinant of the governance effectiveness of audit committees. Focusing on directors with records of administrative sanctions (“tainted” directors), this paper uses a sample of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2012 to 2023 and empirically examines how deficiencies in the qualifications for audit committee members affect corporate financial reporting quality. The study finds that the presence of “tainted” directors in audit committees significantly reduces financial reporting quality. Mechanism testing indicates that the failure of internal monitoring, which exacerbates agency problems, and the increase in external governance pressure, which distorts managerial response strategies, are two key channels through which “tainted” directors impair financial reporting quality. Heterogeneity analysis further reveals that this adverse effect is more pronounced in firms with stronger insider control, lower institutional ownership, weaker internal control quality, and poorer external legal environments. Extension analysis based on the characteristics of “tainted” directors shows that financial reporting quality deteriorates further when “tainted” directors have a higher degree of power penetration, have previously been sanctioned for misconduct directly related to financial reporting, or serve as independent directors or as chairs/conveners of the audit committee. The implementation of stricter regulatory policies can effectively mitigate the negative impact of “tainted” directors on financial reporting quality. This paper provides theoretical support and policy implications for refining China’s legal framework regarding the qualifications for audit committee members in the context of the new Company Law.
关键词: 审计委员会,“污点”董事,行政处罚,财务报告质量