混合所有制、公私合作制及市场准入法的改革论纲

Mixed Ownership, Public-private Partnership and the Reform of Market Access Law

刘大洪,段宏磊

2017 第 19 卷 第 05 期 页码 91-102

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.jsufe.2017.05.008

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摘要

混合所有制与公私合作制改革是推动市场决定性作用得以发挥的“一体两翼”,二者分别着力于特殊行业和公共事业,分别落实市场的深度和广度,拓展非公资本的投资和经营范围。当前市场准入法律制度不能与改革需求相配套:在混合所有制改革所专注的特殊行业,存在对非公资本的显性准入壁垒;在公私合作制改革所聚焦的公共事业,非公资本则一直面临着隐形准入障碍。未来我国的市场准入法律制度体系应当对这一局面进行改革:一方面,以“规制放松”为主要形式对若干领域进行准入规制的卸载式改革,促使若干行业的准入壁垒降低、投资主体多元、市场竞争结构优化,竞争活力提高;另一方面,在拓展非公资本投资准入的同时,进行政府规制法律制度的结构性调整,即“规制再造”,保证在非公资本进入若干特殊领域时仍能使公共利益不受减损。

The reform of both mixed ownership system and public and private cooperative system are the " one body and two wings” which promote the decisive role of the market. The two focus on the special industries and public utilities respectively, carry out the depth and breadth of the market respectively, and expand the investment and business scope of non-public capital. The current market access law system can not be matched with the demand for the reform: in the special industries on which the mixed ownership reform focuses, there are explicit access barriers to non-public capital; in the public utilities that public-private partnership reform focuses on, there are stealth access barriers to non-public capital all the time. In future, China’s market access law system should pay attention to the reform of this situation: on the one hand, the unloading reform of access regulation should be carried out in a number of areas mainly by deregulation, to promote the reduction in barriers to the access to several industries, diversified investment subjects, the optimization of market competition structure, and the increase in competition vitality; on the other hand, when expanding non-public capital investment access, it should make a structural adjustment to government regulation law system, namely regulation reconstruction, to ensure that after non-public capital enters into a number of special areas, the public interests still have no losses.

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