巡视监督、内部控制与企业违规

Inspection Supervision, Internal Control and Enterprise Violation

张建平,张嵩珊

2020 第 42 卷 第 05 期 页码 17-28

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20190926.004

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摘要

作为落实主体整改责任和加强组织建设的手段,巡视巡察体现了党内监督的重要意义。本文研究巡视监督对上市国企违规行为的影响,结果表明巡视程度越高,越能降低企业违规的发生概率,尤其是在内部控制薄弱的企业,巡视监督抑制国企违规的作用更显著。进一步研究发现,相比于内部集团,外部巡视对企业违规行为的抑制作用更显著。本文丰富了巡视与企业违规行为的研究,为实务界提供思路与参考。

By searching and manually organizing the inspection bulletins posted on the Internet from 2013 to 2017 as a sample, this paper studies the impact mechanism of inspection on the irregularities of listed state-owned enterprises. Through the regression analysis of relevant data, the results show that:(1)In the short term, the inspection work has brought a certain impact on the violations of enterprises. Moreover, the higher the degree of inspection, the more it can reduce the probability of enterprise violations.(2)Especially in enterprises with weak internal controls, the role of inspection supervision to curb the occurrence of violations by state-owned enterprises is more significant. On the one hand, due to some similar capabilities, better internal control can substitute for the inspection supervision in the management of the legal and compliant operation of enterprises. On the other hand, poor internal control level will affect corporate governance level and information transparency. Therefore, the inspection will increase the intervention role of enterprise violations.(3)With further research, we find that the external party organization inspection supervision on the suppression of violations is more significant than the internal groups.

This paper enriches the theory of the intrinsic relationship between the patrol work of the Party organization and the violation of regulations by the patrol units, and expands the research on the influence of the patrol supervision on the state-owned enterprises. By sorting out the inspection documents, it is pointed out that enterprises need to better improve the inspection system, implement the supervision responsibility, seize the clues of violations of discipline and law, and promote the solution of problems. At the same time, it provides suggestions for improving the efficiency of internal management and building the internal control system.

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