产业政策与集团公司债务分布

Industrial Policies and Group Company Debt Distribution

吴静桦,邹梓叶,王红建

2019 第 45 卷 第 04 期 页码 17-29

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.2019.04.002

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摘要

探索中国结构性杠杆问题的具体成因,对当前有效“去杠杆”具有重要的理论与现实意义。作为集团公司重要的融资方式之一,集中负债有效刻画了母子公司间的杠杆分布特征。文章从融资便利性出发,考察了产业政策如何影响集团上市公司的集中负债决策及其经济后果,这对于揭示母子公司间的债务分布规律及其成因具有重要意义。研究发现,产业政策支持的集团上市公司更倾向于采取集中负债的模式,这种现象在非国有集团公司中更加明显,而在子公司相对盈利能力强的集团公司中,这种倾向则有所减弱。进一步检验显示,采取集中负债的集团公司扩大了产业政策带来的融资便利性,显著降低了公司的债务融资成本和非效率投资,特别是缓解了公司的投资不足。文章的研究支持了产业政策支持下集团公司集中负债的“融资扩大效应”和“贷款节息效应”。文章从具有中国特色的产业政策视角出发,揭示了集团上市公司集中负债的动机和效果,丰富了公司债务融资治理效应的相关研究,也拓展了宏观产业政策的微观经济效应传导机制的研究框架。

Under the background of imperfect financial system construction in China, the financial development of various regions shows inadequate and unbalanced characteristics. The lag of financial development leads to higher financing constraints, especially in non-state-owned enterprises. At the same time, with more and more diversified business of listed companies, group operation has become an important strategic organizational form for the development of companies, and the financing activities of group companies have a significant impact on their sustainable development. In daily operation, group companies will take the parent company on behalf of the group, undertake the task of raising funds needed for the development of the whole group, and then allocate funds among subsidiaries(hereinafter referred to as " concentrated liabilities”).  At present, China is in the stage of supply-side structural reform, and deleveraging is the most difficult task in supply-side structural reform. Deleveraging is mainly aimed at adjusting the high debt ratio of enterprises. In order to implement the task of deleveraging in an orderly way, the most basic task is to accurately identify the debt ratio of enterprises. Concentrated liabilities of group companies may lead to invisible liabilities of subsidiaries. More importantly, invisible liabilities will gradually increase the systemic risk of the industry and increase the instability of the real economy. Therefore, it is not only of great theoretical significance, but also of profound policy implications to study the concentrated liabilities of group companies.  Based on the above research background, this paper examines the impact of industrial policies on the concentrated liabilities of listed companies and their economic consequences. The test results show that the group listed companies supported by industrial policies have higher degree of concentrated liabilities, and this relationship is more obvious in non-state-owned group companies, while weakening in group companies whose subsidiaries have relatively stronger profitability. The test of economic consequences shows that companies with concentrated liabilities enlarge the financing convenience brought by industrial policies, not only significantly reduce the financing cost of the company debt, but also significantly reduce the inefficient investment of companies, especially alleviate the insufficient investment of companies. The research results also support the " financing expansion effect” of group companies with concentrated liabilities supported by industrial policies, and the " interest-saving effect of loans”.  The possible contributions of this paper are as follows: First, based on the financing convenience of industrial policies, this paper empirically verifies the motivation and mechanism of the group company’s concentrated liabilities. The results show that the group company is more willing to use the method of concentrated liabilities to finance under the support of industrial policies, in order to reduce the financing cost of the company. Second, this paper takes industrial policies as the breakthrough point, and discusses how industrial policies affect the debt way of group listed companies. This is different from the previous studies which simply regard listed companies as a whole. This study will help to expand the research framework of macroeconomic policies and micro-enterprise behavior. Third, using the advantage of financial data disclosure of listed companies in China, this paper studies how group companies choose debt financing under the influence of industrial policies, which is different from the previous focus on micro-factors of group companies, enriching the relevant research on the financial behavior of group companies.

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