蚍蜉撼大树?中小股东诉讼的市场反应研究

Overrating One’s Own Strength? A Research on the Market Reaction to Minority Shareholder Litigation

赵瑞瑞,陈运森

2023 第 49 卷 第 11 期 页码 65-79

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.20230517.101

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摘要

党的二十大报告强调“加强和完善现代金融监管,强化金融稳定保障体系”,而推动中小股东司法救济实践对于防范金融风险和促进资本市场高质量发展具有重要意义。为了解答资本市场如何看待中小股东司法救济实践这一重要问题,文章考察了中小股东发起股东诉讼是否以及如何引起投资者市场反应。研究发现,资本市场对中小股东诉讼的反应显著为负。区分案件类型显示,市场对证券虚假陈述和共同诉讼案件的反应为负。对于案件特征,当涉案金额和人数较多以及获得投服中心诉讼支持时,市场反应更加负面。对于公司特征,市场反应在违法违规风险较高、投资者保护意识较差、信息披露质量较低以及外部信息环境较好的公司中更加负面。进一步分析发现,新《证券法》审议通过后,中小股东诉讼各项特征的市场反应更加敏感,说明加强资本市场法律基础建设有利于增强中小股东诉讼的震慑效应。此外,市场反应越负面预示中小股东获得胜诉裁决的可能性越大。文章研究表明,中小股东诉讼具有事后司法追责的震慑效应,但其信息含量依赖于法律基础的夯实,这为贯彻党的二十大报告中关于金融监管和规范资本市场发展的要求提供了启示。

Safeguarding the rights of minority investors is a crucial task in maintaining the healthy development of the capital market. The report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China emphasized the need to strengthen and improve modern financial supervision. In the process of enhancing modern financial supervision, a multi-level public enforcement mechanism has been established to deter securities violations, including administrative supervision and inquiry letters. However, compared to the strong deterrent effect of the public enforcement mechanism, the private enforcement mechanism in China is still imperfect, and its effectiveness is not optimistic. Enhancing the legal infrastructure for minority shareholder litigation is of significant importance in protecting the rights of minority shareholders and promoting the healthy and high-quality development of the capital market.

This paper aims to investigate how the capital market perceives the practice of judicial relief for minority shareholders. The findings reveal that the capital market has a significantly negative reaction to shareholder litigation. This negative reaction is more pronounced for cases related to securities misrepresentation and class actions. Additionally, the market reaction becomes increasingly negative as more money and more people being involved, and lawsuit support from China Securities Investor Services Center being obtained. The market reaction is also more negative for companies with higher risks of violations, lower awareness of investor protection, lower quality of information disclosure, and better external information environment. Further analysis shows that after the approval of the new “Securities Law”, the market reaction to the characteristics of minority shareholder litigation becomes more sensitive, which indicates that the legal construction in the capital market can improve the deterrent effect of minority shareholder litigation. The conclusions show that minority shareholder litigation has a deterrent effect, but its information content depends on the consolidation of legal infrastructure.

The marginal contributions are as follows: First, this paper provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of minority shareholder litigation under the background of Chinese system. Second, this paper enriches the research on the legislative impact on the capital market. The study suggests that the implementation of the new “Securities Law” improves the legal infrastructure of the capital market. Third, this paper offers policy implications for improving the mechanisms of protecting the rights of minority shareholders and promoting the high-quality and healthy development of the capital market. Importantly, it provides policy insights on how to implement the requirements outlined in the report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China regarding the standardized development of the capital market.

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